

VICTORIA POLICE AND LEADERSHIP IN COUNTER TERRORISM ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

# INTERNATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM FORUM



MELBOURNE

11 - 13 DECEMBER 2017



VICTORIA POLICE

## FORUM PROCEEDINGS




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
## CORPORATE PARTNERS





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# SPEAKER PRESENTATIONS

## Host Department Message – Victoria Police

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- ▶ Shane Patton, Acting Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police
- ▶ Ross Guenther, Assistant Commissioner, Victoria Police
- ▶ Phil Shepherd, Director Leadership Education, Australian Institute of Police Management

Australia has not escaped the global threat of violent extremism and terrorism. Just in one year in the state of Victoria, there have been plots to run down and behead police officers, explode a device in Melbourne, carry out shootings on New Year's, a hostage siege with a shooting of a Victoria Police officer, and a bombing planned by a 17-year-old.

Countering the terrorism threat is a global responsibility, which is why we were extremely proud to host this meeting of the LinCT Alumni Association. LinCT and the conference meet the need for the global counter terrorism community to exchange good practices and think together about strategies for prevention and investigation. The role of the LinCT organization in global terrorism prevention is vital. As an example, a 2014 plot in Australia was uncovered thanks to responders who had been classmates at LinCT. The conference presenters represent an impressive group in terrorism prevention, which made this conference a fantastic opportunity to engage in critical thinking and share best practices for the challenges that we will face in the future.

Terrorism is not something any one of us can manage in isolation. We can use the collective experience and expertise of all of the attendees. We hope everyone had a chance to meet new people and get to know each other, because these may be the people you need to call in the future for help. We are reminded of something said by one of our famous Commissioners, Mick Miller. Leaders either make things happen, let things happen, or do not know what happened. Everyone that is a part of this LinCT conference are leaders who make things happen and who took the time to learn the most they could to make our countries safer and more resilient to terrorism.




Acting Chief Commissioner Shane Patton



Assistant Commissioner Ross Guenther



Phil Shepherd




One of the common things we heard from all of the presenters is that the threat and associated challenges have never been greater than they are today. Some of the other key takeaways we heard from conference attendees during our end of Day One critical thinking section and throughout the conference include the following:



### Partnerships

We have been talking about this for decades, but it is unclear if we do this well yet. We can think about how we are going to grow our partnerships to a better level. It might help to think about the newest partnerships we may have built. It is also worth considering whether we have tried to build partnerships with those we may not know or with those we think we may not have common ground. As Gill Hicks suggests, we can all go find someone we think we do not like and walk beside them. We can challenge ourselves to increase the frequency that we can connect with people who see the world differently.



### Agility and Response

We like to do things in a certain way and we like to respond in a certain way. It might make no sense the way we continue to do the same thing for so many years. There are two ways of thinking – the automatic thinking or the thinking where you have to concentrate on the task. So often in life, we desperately want to fall to the automatic response, but to get better we may need to stop and do some thinking about the response.




### Maintaining Focus

It needs to be considered how to hold the focus when the threat does not stop. We see examples from people like Mary Fetchet and Gill Hicks that we may be able to learn from.

We want to thank the entire team with the Victoria Police Team and LinCT – AA, including Amanda Cavallin, Mike Ferrence, and the LinCT Board for their support in developing the program. It is amazing to work with people from around the world to put on a world-class event. We appreciate your participation.

We thank everyone for attending and for the long distances many of our attendees traveled to be a part of the conference. We greatly appreciate the ongoing work done by all of the 480 attendees and the wisdom you shared. We look forward to hosting again in 2018.



# DAY ONE


## Commonwealth Government Address

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
► Honorable Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

With many nations facing similar counter terrorism challenges, LinCT plays a valuable role. The unfortunate reality is the continuing and growing threat. Threat detection has become more difficult and extremists are more determined to inflict harm and they continue to use the Internet to radicalize young people. In Australia, there have been five terrorist attacks, thirty-five plots, 70 people charged with terrorism (five of those being juveniles), 220 passports seized, 3,000 visas cancelled, and 40 foreign fighters identified since 2014, when the threat level was increased. I want to pay tribute to those officers who have responded to those attacks and have protected the public on the front line and prevented further deaths.

Just recently, in July 2017, an attack plot was thwarted involving the attempted smuggling of a device onto an international flight in Sydney. This is just one of many of examples of why there can never be a place for complacency. Standing still equals going backwards. As Daesh has crumbled we now try to understand how the threat will change. We must be able to anticipate these foreign threats. Increased funding alone is not enough. Enhanced coordination between intelligence and law enforcement is needed. The Commonwealth has put in place significant reforms with a new Department of Home Affairs, based largely on the model of the Home Office in the United Kingdom and the Department of Homeland Security in the United States. It will incorporate national security, criminal justice, border protection, immigration, emergency management, federal police, and all things that can help to support the funding of terrorism (e.g., illicit drugs, child exploitation, cyber threats). It will better enable Australia to improve the safety of the country and has already resulted in agencies providing intelligence around their top targets. The most important thing is for us all to collaborate in this fight against terrorism.



Honorable Peter Dutton MP



## Global Terrorism Threat


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- ▶ Phil Shepherd, Director Leadership Education, Australian Institute of Police Management - Facilitator
- ▶ Jennifer Hurst, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Australian Federal Police
- ▶ Tom Schultz, Legal Attaché Senior Executive Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- ▶ Neil Basu, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, SO15 Metropolitan Police
- ▶ James Malizia, Assistant Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- ▶ Mike Clement, Deputy Commissioner, National Operations, New Zealand Police

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Partnerships are the front line of a counter terrorism strategy which includes trying to move people away from radicalization.
- ✓ Diversion efforts are meant to find a non-punitive way of assessing and developing alternatives to prosecution with a focus on reintegration and rehabilitation.
- ✓ It is important that all levels of policing work in an integrated plan.
- ✓ The continuing relationship between intelligence and law enforcement is vital to combatting the threat.
- ✓ Attacks by lone actors going from “flash to bang” quickly using low means of technology and requiring little expense and planning, which makes them hard to detect.
- ✓ There needs to be increased border enforcement with tighter visa and entry requirements with the foreign fighter threat.
- ✓ Counter terrorism is all about partnerships and trust and the need to coordinate globally with a global approach.
- ✓ The public needs to be leveraged with increased transparency and education of all the threats and how they can be a party to identifying the next threat actor.
- ✓ Trust needs to be built with the public to leverage their eyes and ears.
- ✓ Prevention is the preferred focus, but it is hard to focus on prevention activities if frequent attacks cause reactive and investigative efforts to take large amounts of resources which is a dangerous pattern.
- ✓ The community is likely to spot a threat before law enforcement, but they lack an understanding of the threat. Human intelligence makes the strongest difference.
- ✓ The Internet needs to be harnessed for benefit by finding a way to review the overwhelming amount of data and counter the extremist recruitment and instruction efforts.
- ✓ The continuing reduction in police resources continues to be one of the biggest problems.
- ✓ As first responders for mental health, there needs to be a system that can be more responsive to the more disenfranchised communities.
- ✓ Everyone should be involved in prevention activities.
- ✓ It takes an incredible amount of effort to change an organization and it takes a generation, so it has to start today.
- ✓ Community engagement and prevention are not optional.





- ✓ There are many areas to consider in improving the ability to counter the threat:





We are all dealing with same, if not similar threat that may be increasing. The difference may be in the scale. With a scale of five possible threat levels in Australia for the likelihood of an attack, the country is at the third level of Probable. We see Daesh looking to initiate attacks against police and intelligence officers in addition to the public, and there is a concern that returning terror suspects or those who were prevented from traveling will become further radicalized. There is also the possibility that any of these will try to facilitate an attack overseas, expanding the international threat. The Joint Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTT) are currently investigating 216 persons of interest, across 87 active investigations, which is a 700 percent increase in the number of investigations in the past four years. There also have recently been 14 major disruptions and 5 terrorist attacks. Sydney and Melbourne are where the bulk of the investigations are taking place. The threat in Southeast Asia is a real concern, with Western interests there continuing to be a target.

Daesh represents the most significant threat through aggressive promotion of violent extremism. Most attackers are Sunni males and the trend is towards a younger age group. There has been a real shift to smaller-scale, lone-actor threats that require low cost, low capability, local financing, and involve weapons that are easy to acquire. This makes it very hard to detect the plots in advance since there is a very short planning horizon. The impact of these attacks is still significant. The challenge for law enforcement is to still look for and identify precursor activities before an attack. The social media strategy of Daesh is sophisticated and appeals to our youth and it is hard to deal with the volume of information on social media to possibly find the precursor activities where they are trying to recruit, radicalize, direct, coordinate attacks, train, and raise finances.

However, a recent airline plot in Sydney, Operation Silves, was disrupted and went against all the new trends. It involved an Australian-based individual around 50 years old preparing for an attack against Australian aviation using improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and an improvised chemical dispersal weapon. It involved a significant level of direction from Daesh to enable the individual to have the advanced explosives capabilities. There continues to be concern there will be ongoing threats like this of a more complicated nature across Western countries.

The foreign fighter threat requires law enforcement and intelligence coordination to track those, including women and children, who are likely to have a predisposition to violent action through the gathering of intelligence, extradition requests, and arrests.





**Acting Assistant Commissioner  
Jennifer Hurst**

Approximately 220 Australians traveled to Syria and Iraq in support of terrorism and it is estimated there are about 110 still there fighting. At least 68-87 are believed to have been killed, which leaves about 40 who have returned to Australia. Approximately an additional 200 people are being investigated for supporting terrorism or looking to travel. To combat this, Australia has cancelled about 220 passports and there are additional legislative measures being pursued, including passport suspension, cessation of Australian citizenship for those with dual citizenship, and making foreign incursion and recruitment illegal. The counter terrorism strategy is based on partnerships, with prevention as a first line of defense which includes trying to move people away from radicalization. Diversion efforts are meant to find a non-punitive way of assessing and developing alternatives to prosecution with a focus on reintegration and rehabilitation. Disruption efforts use traditional and whole of government investigations and prosecution. Cooperation and intelligence sharing among law enforcement and border and transportation security continues to be a focus, with extremist messaging on social media and terrorist financing being areas for monitoring. Working to increase the capacity and capability of partners has

helped address the threat. Since every counter terrorism investigation has an international nexus, Australia has posted Counter Terrorism Liaison Officers in seven countries around the world, which has been essential to meet shared security objectives. The continuing relationship between intelligence and law enforcement is vital to combatting the threat.


The principal threat in Canada is violent extremists who are either inspired, directed, or enabled by foreign terrorist organizations, including Daesh and Al Qaeda. Attacks have tended to involve small arms and vehicles. The threat is changing, with attacks by lone actors going from “flash to bang” quickly using low means of technology and requiring little expense and planning, which makes them hard to detect as pointed out by others. In Canada’s recent attacks, the perpetrators were known in four of the five cases. This exemplifies the challenges involved in the assessment of the priority of the threat of the individuals. Four of the five were listed as having low or no threat and they had been investigated or were on peace bonds. The peace bonds allow the court to apply conditions to these individuals (e.g., no use of Internet), but there is a challenge to enforce them successfully. The court can authorize home entry to make sure people are respecting the conditions.

The risk of foreign fighters returning to Canada is increasing and their families may be just as radical. The threat to civil aviation continues to be a concern with the possible use of IEDs against commercial traffic. A lot of the conversation has focused on Daesh, but Al Qaeda should not be overlooked since they have shown they are in it for the long-term. Terrorism investigations span the country across both urban and rural areas. Canada has successfully prosecuted 26 individuals, 16 are waiting prosecution, and 14 have peace bonds that have been applied on them. Another six have been charged, but are still overseas.

A couple of recent examples of attacks in Canada exemplify the evolution of the threat, including one that involved an individual who became known to Canada through information from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The individual was in the final stages of planning the attack and had declared war on Canada and was pledging allegiance to Daesh. There was concern that making a public announcement about the plot would incite the individual to act, so it was decided not to release the information publicly. A related video was shared with trusted law enforcement but was leaked outside the law enforcement community. The identity of the individual was confirmed to be Aaron Driver through voice analytics. A decision needed to be made quickly about how to interdict the plot, which included putting surveillance on his workplace and residence. Just twelve hours after learning of the plot, he entered a taxi at his residence – a very quick flash to bang leaving not much time to find him and act. While trying to take him into custody he detonated a device in the taxi and was shot and killed. The decision not to go public with the plot was based on the trust around



**Assistant Commissioner  
James Malizia**



the table that the collection of partners dealing with the incident had the ability to stop him, which was proven correct in the successful conclusion.

The future threat will likely involve the possibility that Daesh will establish new travel routes with their depletion of territory. We will have to proactively relocate ourselves and identify new sources and collection needs and means, but the Daesh messaging will live online forever. We will also need to remain nimble with the threat of foreign fighters and their families. Significant intervention efforts will be necessary for the children, that will involve teams from health, social services, education, and other agencies. We also have to be prepared for attackers with extreme right-wing rhetoric and the sensitivities involved when they are charged with homicide but not terrorism and have attacked a specific community or a mosque. This requires a lot of communication and outreach to Muslim communities to make sure they understand the reasons behind the charges. It is important that all levels of policing work in an integrated plan. Counter terrorism is all about partnerships and trust and the need to coordinate globally with a global approach.




Tom Schultz

In the United States, there have been 112 suspects arrested over the past year. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) have been leveraged to secure charges and disrupt activity as early as possible in line with the very low threat tolerance. We have used our material support to terrorism charges on 25, five additional were charged with lying to federal investigators, and for the rest (82) a wide variety of charges were used, including immigration and fraud. Whatever charges can be used with them to get them out of the picture are considered. There is also a domestic terrorism threat, including the threat to law enforcement from the left-wing and black community as a result of the grievances regarding police shootings that have resulted in a number of different attacks. From the right-wing there have been multiple attacks planned, but not as many have matured. There have been 186 arrests over the last year involving charges on felons in the possession of firearms, and 15 of those have matured to bombing or explosive charges.

The public expectation is that a terrorism threat is likely. Threats are now more persistently using IEDs or low technology devices like personal weapons and vehicles, yet the threat of an attack using higher technology continues. Even the attacks using explosives that resulted in low casualties were highly visible.

The Silves threat in Australia involved international connectivity, including to the United States. Efforts are continuing to watch the returning foreign fighters and different conflict zones and the old threat continues to become the new threat every few years. Going Dark and encryption is going to be a challenge for some time and a new solution is required for every new app and each new update to a device or app. Some corporate policies limit law enforcement ability to obtain their assistance which significantly impacts investigations. The public expectation has evolved on privacy, so the sophistication of technology to meet these expectations can help criminals. National borders complicate mitigation strategies, so communications need to continue between countries and between their law enforcement and international border agencies. There also needs to be increased border enforcement with tighter visa and entry requirements. Today's threats with foreign fighters bring us back to those roots of border protection.

Individuals with mental health issues – those who are often problems for schools, communities, and families – make them more susceptible to radicalization. Counter terrorism in the United States is a responsibility of the federal government working with local partners. There are varying degrees of funding, tools, and capabilities for countering violent extremism (CVE) strategies at the local level. Hopefully, a solution can be found on the national level, so there does not have to be a reliance on just the locals. The public needs to be leveraged with increased transparency and education of all the threats and how they can be a party to identifying the next threat actor. Trust needs to be built with the public to leverage their eyes and ears. We cannot rely on technology to solve our problems here.



Recent attacks in the United Kingdom have left 36 dead and hundreds physically injured. That is something security services feel every single day and it acts as a reminder of the heroics that have been taken by our young law enforcement heroes. The United Kingdom is at the second highest threat level of Severe and has recently been at Critical twice, which means the country is at the highest threat levels ever experienced. After some of the attacks of 2017, there was no assurance that the network of attackers had been captured, so in response, military were dispatched for the first time in the history of the country which is extremely frightening for the public. Terrorist-related arrests have increased to a frightening pace with 460 arrests in a year. The five recent attacks have all involved British-born attackers – domestic people who wanted to kill the own countrymates. Nine plots have been disrupted in an eight-month period between March and September 2017. In the four previous years there were no attacks and 14 disruptions. Currently, there are 1,200 leads and 600 investigations which is up from 400 just a year ago. Of the top 15 threats tracked by the United Kingdom, there used to just be two to three considered solid attacks, and now 11 of the 15 are considered solid attacks. Operations security, encryption, and the short flash to bang horizon are challenges to stopping the threat. We know the question is not if there will be an attack but when.



**Deputy Assistant Commissioner  
Neil Basu**

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), security service, and police all advise that the threat has shifted which has resulted in not being as well-prepared to counter this threat. Efforts have been focused on trying to break the momentum of the attack, and a lot of this has been reactive and investigative in nature and not preventive which is dangerous. The Constrain Operation was successful in seizing a lot of suspected terrorists, but Al Muhajiroun (ALM) especially continues to maintain a grip on communities. A lot of focus is still on breaking that group.

There are some advantages the United Kingdom has to counter these threats, including a very joined-up government with 50 years of experience countering terrorism; a local to global strategy with 42 Counter Terrorism Liaison Officers stationed overseas; being an island which makes it harder to access; and strict gun laws. The counter terrorism machine was built for complex plots not lone actors and those with mental health issues who have been radicalized and use methods that are often cheap, hard to spot, and hard to stop. The community is likely to spot a threat before law enforcement, but they lack an understanding of the threat. Human intelligence makes the strongest difference. Looking forward, there is more we can do. Trust for the Muslim community could be higher, especially when we are all fighting the same fight. The Internet needs to be harnessed for benefit. We need to find a way to review the overwhelming amount of data on the Internet and counter the


efforts of recruiters to use the Internet and social media for recruitment and instruction. We are liberal democracies still debating privacy and security, so this impacts what we are able to do with the Internet. There are many areas for continuing improvement to counter the threat: recruit the media to help; address disenfranchised communities; reform the unregulated education sector and home-schooled environment where children can easily be influenced; increase the efforts for advanced passenger information to assess travelers; and reduce the ease of accessing precursor chemicals and components for bomb-making and manufacturing of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP). We can also address the upcoming release of terrorist prisoners, the insider threat in transportation, increasing use of firearms, and returning families of foreign fighters. The continuing reduction in police resources continues to be one of the biggest problems.



**Deputy Commissioner  
Mike Clement**

New Zealand has a population of just under 5 million, with a growing immigrant population. There is one national police service with 12,000 personnel. A recently published strategy for law enforcement indicates a top priority is to establish trust among the population and confidence in public safety. New Zealand wants to be the safest country, with people being


safe and feeling safe. Prevention is the first priority across all of policing. The national police service is pushing to be far better and relevant to all communities, including those with mental health issues. As first responders for mental health, there needs to



be a system that can be more responsive to the more disenfranchised communities. Some might think this is not the responsibility of the police, but many organizations might also say that. There also has been an effort to confront unconscious biased, which is a tough conversation to have with communities. All of this requires a social investment and making sure communities and individuals are not treated as statics by police or other agencies. Victims are deserving of attention.



On the prevention side, New Zealand has a relatively benign environment without the same threats being faced by the other members of the Five Eyes. Police should identify what prevention involves and who is involved in prevention, with the goal of having everyone involved. Imagine the possible impact if all are coordinated in prevention. There are people of interest that are being addressed by reaching out to partners and communities. Lessons learned from partners, including Australia, are being used in our approaches and we need to constantly learn from each other. Community engagement and prevention are not optional – this is critically important. It takes an incredible amount of effort to change an organization and it takes a generation, so it has to start today. That is the same with including communities – it needs to start yesterday. There need to be closer working relationships with all of these partners and there needs to be continuing assessment of whether they are deep and sincere enough. There need to be considerations for how to test them to see if they are good enough and if communities see the police as genuine leaders whether they feel strong enough to stand up beside police. There is no magic formula and is just about continuing to push.



## The Global and Regional Threat of the Islamic State

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► Dr. Jolene Jerard, Deputy Head Centre of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Consider how law enforcement training and tactics should be adapted as the threat continues to change.
- ✓ Important considerations for the future should be:
  - Preventing security fatigue
  - Trying to step out of silos
  - Detecting hostile surveillance
  - Building resilience through winning hearts and minds
  - Whether there needs to be gender-specific strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism

Resilience and resolve is growing against the global threat. In this evolving threat environment there have been tactical shifts on the ground. Societies and communities will come together to prevent these attacks. The threat continues to evolve and when you strike down one threat, more pop up, as has been seen in the years between Al Qaeda and Daesh. The threat will continue to evolve, but it is unknown what this means for police and security services. Strategies for law enforcement and analysis are going through cycles of adaptation to these threats. There are things missing from strategies, but often it is about the unknown unknowns. It is also unknown what the effect is when everyone is continually operating at a high threat level with an increase in resources, re-evaluating technical skills, more operational manhours, and additional shift rotations. There is an unholy triumvirate that is also complicating matters: polarized society; reduced cost of technology; and increasing capacity of non-state actors. These are disruptive agents and disruptive technologies. Younger individuals are becoming involved in terrorism and they are digital natives to these disruptive technologies.


This threat environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). This is exemplified by a few recent incidents, including Iraq's announcement that they have removed Daesh. It is unclear what this means for the global threat environment; whether VUCA will continue; how it impacts what it means to be safe and secure; and how to brace ourselves against these changing threats. Community policing and prosecution strategies will need to be examined in these changing contexts. Analysts are also continually challenged to operate in this changing threat landscape since there are so many models for radicalization, including those based on personal grievance, political grievance, love, and status and thrill seeking. It is a challenge to see where this leave us from a tactical point of view.

Even with Daesh's physical loss of territory, their effective use of social media for messaging, effective tactics on the ground, highly motivated fighters, ample funds and resources, and a decentralized command structure means they are still a threat. When posing the question to detainees of why they act, they answer for God, family, and country. While it is unsure what country they are referencing since Daesh is not a country, it is curious to note that many military members in the Five Eyes would answer that question the same way. It is worth considering how people draw the line between supporting a terrorist group versus their country's military.

The newer paradigm of the threat of foreign fighters, with approximately 100,000 foreign fighters, there is an unknown for what they will do. The largest numbers of fighters came from Belgium, France, and the rest of Europe. One of the challenges for dealing with foreign fighter returnees is that countries may not have integration programs. How law enforcement training and

tactics should be adapted to this threat needs to be considered and that will be a continuing question for security analysts to





address. The cycles of adaptation from the terrorist groups need to be recognized for future threat projections. They can be treated as a growing organism looking for organization in chaos. Potential shifts in terrorist tactics might first be seen in places like West Africa, where they may use more guerilla-style tactics, which may require the West to help developing countries to protect themselves. There has also been a proliferation of groups in Southeast Asia, with an increased number of groups pledging allegiance to Daesh, and that does not even include Al Qaeda-related activity.



Dr Jolene Jerard


When terrorist territories collapse it is unknown where these groups go and how that impacts the security challenge. It might mean the revival of their old routes or operating grounds with camps and training facilities where they could build their comradeship and capabilities. They may also try to reestablish control within old areas, which can all happen within a short time period as has been seen in Southeast Asia. It might also include a transition out of the jungle and rural environment and into urban fighting. There will likely continue to be small cells and loose networks, and can involve attacks being planned from prison facilities. The prison threat will also include the release of convicted terrorists who have been away for more than a decade. When prosecuting these cases, sentences have sometimes been lenient because many of the lawyers and judges felt unprotected. The idea of a power imbalance within these prison facilities between the prison security and prisoners can be disconcerting, with terrorists often holding the upper hand. If while in prison your friends are terrorists, your friends will still be terrorists when you are released.

There has been a call for terrorist groups in Southeast Asia to unite under one common banner, leaving tribalism behind. They are targeting leaders in Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially Muslim leaders. In this diffused threat, a lone actor is an expanded idea. The lone actor may still belong to a network to which he gave his oath of allegiance remotely, but the alliance now includes the notion of bravado, since the caliphate is asking them to not to be sheep, but to be wolves – to be lions of the caliphate. They look at themselves as lone wolves – leading the pack, leading the direction - marauding to wage mass slaughters, break the frontlines of battles, and enacting as much damage as possible with suicide as a last result if trapped. Daesh messaging has suggested different attack strategies: participate in jihad by traveling to Iraq; and stay where you are and conduct attacks from there against enemies. There has also been a transition in the role of women from supporting the men in their activities on the ground to acting as enforcers of regime, conducting attacks, acting as messengers for recruitment, and generating funds.

The emerging trends seem to be the continuation of radicalization; a return to guerilla tactics; a reinvigoration of cyber activities; attempts to recover territory; and increased activity from returnees, recidivists, and deportees. Terrorist use of Internet will continue to involve psychological warfare, publicity for their cause, and propaganda. There is also the possibility for the increased use of cyber crime and terrorism. There have also been a few instances of female officers becoming an insider threat when they have been radicalized by or fallen in love with terrorists. There is an increasing possibility of rockets being used as an attack tactic in the future by launching a Qassam-style rocket from a marine location or to a marine target. These rockets would be an ideal means for an attack and they are difficult to detect. The design of these type of rockets can be found on hobbyist sites.



Important considerations for the future should be preventing security fatigue, trying to step out of silos, detecting hostile surveillance, building resilience through winning hearts and minds, and whether there needs to be gender-specific strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism.



## Crowded Places Case Study – The Pulse Nightclub, Orlando

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► Philip Scott Thorlin, Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation


### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Know your local partners, including police, fire, emergency medical responders, hospitals, and media.
- ✓ The intention of the leaders needs to be clear to everyone in the command post and their needs to be an understanding for their capabilities– what they can and cannot do.
- ✓ Compassion needs to be extended to both victims and response personnel.
- ✓ Make sure personnel do not crash and burn and become combat ineffective.
- ✓ During an attacker's reconnaissance period is the opportunity to intercede.
- ✓ While exercises can be a pain, good ones get everyone in the same room talking.
- ✓ When addressing the media everyone has to be on the same sheet of music – fire, police, and national resources.
- ✓ In establishing a command post, communication between tactical and operational command elements and priorities must be established so everyone understands the plan.
- ✓ It is better to come up with the good idea and execute that plan and make it work than transitioning to new ideas.
- ✓ There needs to be a battle handover between shifts, with people showing up 15 minutes ahead of their shift to have a long discussion with the person they are relieving to go over the objectives that have been completed, any changes in priorities, what priorities are being addressed, and who is dealing with them.
- ✓ You have to put personnel in a position where support is available to them.

This is a perspective on what was done, what was done right, and what might be done differently, especially since a lot of information in the press was not exactly accurate. The attack took place at the Pulse nightclub which was known among the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Forty-nine people were killed, and of those some had not yet come out to their friends and family as being gay, which complicated family notifications and victim involvement in the aftermath and investigation. The community of Orlando has stepped up to embrace the LGBT community after the attack which is a positive outcome of this event. The real lesson in this event is to know your local partners, including police, fire, emergency medical responders, hospitals, and media. Leadership, capacity, and compassion are the only way to get through these types of incidents. The intention of the leaders needs to be clear to everyone in the command post and their needs to be an understanding for their capabilities– what they can and cannot do. Those capabilities have to be used efficiently since the response will be a marathon and not a sprint. Compassion needs to be extended to both victims and response personnel. This means having to tell people showing up at a command post they need to go home for now, because they will be needed down the line. It is also about making sure personnel do not crash and burn and become combat ineffective.

Daesh is decentralized and accepts more into their fold than Al Qaeda, which makes it easier for them to radicalize people over the Internet. It is not usually the first generation of refugees who are at risk, but it is the second generation. That was the situation for the Pulse shooter, Omar Mateen, who was married and had a child. He was a subject of two Miami FBI assessments and the FBI exercised every power they had to make sure he was not a threat. Just because an individual is not radicalized at one point in time, does not mean they cannot be radicalized later after an assessment has been done. Someone can radicalize quickly and step into the execution of an attack quickly. After the attack, Omar Mateen became radicalized within





the span of a month and when he decided to act he did it within a week. During an attacker's reconnaissance period is the opportunity to intercede.

After the attack, it was discovered the Pulse nightclub was not his first choice of targets. It is believed he was planning to use a stroller with a baby doll to conceal his weapons and go to another public venue. He went to a couple of public venues the night of the shooting before going to the Pulse, but there was a large police presence at both of them. He found the Pulse nightclub through online searches and did a quick assessment since the venue was previously unknown to him. He then returned with his gun and initiated the attack. His radicalization appears to have started by looking at Anwar al-Awlaki and Daesh videos, including the burning of the Jordanian pilot. He also had searches about jihad ideology, weight loss, and depression. There were spikes in his searches the last two months before the attack and the week before the attack he started to search weapons, Boston bombings, no fly status, San Bernardino, and forgiveness in Islam. During the shooting he called 911 to announce his allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State. There were public theories that Mateen had a double-life and was gay, but after investigating all aspects of the situation that could never be confirmed. It is not believed he specifically targeted a location popular with the LGBT community because he did not even know where he was calling from when he made his call to 911.




Supervisory Special Agent Philip Scott Thorlin

Most shootings (75 percent) are resolved within five minutes, so the response is about how quickly police can get to the scene. Mateen had a .223 caliber semi-automatic weapon that he used to fire over 200 rounds in the club that night, each of which could go through two people to hit a third. There were over 200 people in the bar that night. An off-duty officer was providing security outside the bar that night and he actually saw Mateen and shot at him twice, but the officer was concerned he would be shooting friendlies and so stopped. Within three minutes of the start of the shooting, five police officers who were already near the scene, were able to respond and make entry. While the police engaged with the shooter there was a stop in the shooting to try to determine if trapped victims were being held hostage. In this type of a situation, victims can run, hide, or fight. Those are the only options. You run as long as you can, and you fight for the rest of your life. There were opportunities for those in attendance to fight during the long periods Mateen was changing magazines, but people may not be conditioned to do this so many just acted like they were dead.

It was a dark, surreal environment for responders with heavy casualties that can be hard for responders who have not seen these types of terrible conditions. While exercises can be a pain, good ones get everyone in the same room talking. The Level 1 trauma hospital that was nearby the Pulse had recently been through an 18-hour exercise that involved responding to many shooting victims. The hospital attributes their recent exercise experience to the fact that every one of the people from Pulse that went into the hospital that night survived.


Efforts were made to evacuate the trapped victims during the stop in the shooting and get victims treated in a triage area. Within five minutes after the shooting started there were numerous additional officers who had arrived and within seven minutes 20 officers were responding. Part of the challenge of responding to these types of events is determining if there were additional shooters. Some witnesses were reporting an additional shooter, which turned out to be one of the responders in plain clothes with a mask over his face. Because Mateen had already called 911, contact was made with him to try to negotiate with him to come out to avoid a close-quarters shootout in the bathroom where he was holed up. Negotiations failed, and a bearcat was used to ram holes in the room where he was. Mateen came out shooting but was shot and fell back into the hole. An exit sign fell on him, which made it look like he was wearing a suicide vest. All of the FBI's main ballistics resources were two hours away in Tampa.



In the response, no victims were hit by friendly fire. The crime scene was an incredible sight with water, blood, and shattered glass everywhere. Digital forensics were also extensive with every device people carrying having the possibility of having evidence. The media was right there filming everything and when addressing the media everyone has to be on the same sheet of music – fire, police, and FBI. The media is a vital partner in communicating with the families of the victims. Additional challenges included cross jurisdictional issues within the FBI since Mateen came from Miami. In establishing a command post, communication between tactical and operational command elements and priorities must be established so everyone understands the plan. It is better to come up with the good idea and execute that plan and make it work than transitioning to new ideas. There should be top down support, with bottom up refinement.



Leadership needs to pull together the best players on the team and then support them and be ready to push them back out before they are burned out, so they can come back and be effective. A human resource manager can be assigned to help this process, including the staffing and turnover. There needs to be a battle handover between shifts, with people showing up 15 minutes ahead of their shift to have a long discussion with the person they are relieving to go over the objectives that have been completed, any changes in priorities, what priorities are being addressed, and who is dealing with them. The individuals need to take this responsibility. Leadership also needs to make sure employee assistance is provided. It would be worrying if someone goes through that type of an incident without having an emotional reaction. While you cannot make people take advantage of this on an individual basis, you can consider ordering teams to go into a room with assistance. You have to put people in a position where support is available to them.



## Adapting to the Evolving Threat – The UK Experience

- ▶ Neil Basu, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, SO15 Metropolitan Police, Senior National Coordinator for UK Counter Terrorism Policing


### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Exercising and taking care of your people is absolutely critical.
- ✓ The cornerstone of any counter terrorism strategy needs to be a synergy between police, security services, government, and the community.
- ✓ The threat is so diverse, so it is futile to try to profile a terrorist.
- ✓ We need to treat any violent attacks of extremism the same, whether they are white supremacists or affiliates of foreign terrorist organizations.
- ✓ We have to do better at identifying the real priorities and there has to be a better system to prioritize the threat.
- ✓ We need the right data sets and the right questions to ask of the data, possibly through artificial intelligence and machine learning.
- ✓ A national multi-agency clearinghouse is needed for sharing data between agencies.
- ✓ There is a need for stronger border control that includes stronger biometrics.
- ✓ Institutions that are at risk for radicalization need to be empowered with counter messaging.
- ✓ Continuing efforts are needed to target hate on the Internet and get large companies to embrace that effort.
- ✓ Laws need to change to require healthcare workers to report concerns about their patients being radicalized.
- ✓ The private sector desperately wants to help and there needs to be a way to get them and communities playing a larger role

The current threat is so dynamic, variable, and unpredictable. In just a handful of recent experiences in the United Kingdom, there have been six completely different attack methodologies. Mitigating this changing and evolving threat is a challenge. The United Kingdom counter terrorism machine is evolving in the context of the “Four Ps” (Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare) of the Contest strategy, with pursue and prevent being the focus to catch and prevent terrorists and stop them from recruiting others. Only policing delivers across all of the Four Ps.

Exercising and taking care of your people is absolutely critical. We would often describe the counter terrorism machine in the United Kingdom as world-class and best in class, but it does need to adapt to survive. Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles are still important. We are here to prevent crime, which fits with this conference’s objectives. Prevent is the most attacked part of the strategy and most under-funded. We have evolved only after adapting after each wave of incidents, which is how Special Branch and MI5 were created as extraordinary organizations. After the Irish peace accord, the United Kingdom was questioning its counter terrorism mission.

London carries about sixty percent of the risk of the entire country. The 2003 Contest strategy, which remains largely unchanged, came out of a growing threat from homegrown terrorists coming from small English communities outside London. Counter terrorism policing is now embedded all through the country, to mirror where plotting now takes place. There are nine



regional CT units nationally and over 7,000 people working to counter terrorism. Every large-scale incident has required assistance from across the network. There was a four-year period where there were no attacks, but with Abu Mohammad al-Adnani's messaging a new wave was expected – targeting police/soldiers, targeting crowded places, and now using crude and simple techniques.

The cornerstone of any counter terrorism strategy needs to be a synergy between police, security services, government, and the community. They need to sit together, decide strategy together, work together daily, and coordinate tasks and assets together. The 124,000 police officers (with only twelve percent of them armed) stationed throughout the country are the ones with access to communities and those communities are supportive, with police having confidence ratings in the high seventy percentiles.

There is a focus on the returning fighters, knowing they will be mad when they return home. They may be ready to use simple attack methods that will allow them to act quickly, which makes them harder to detect. Segregated and isolated communities are those vulnerable to extremist messaging and it is often the second generation after a family moves to a new country who feel the most disenfranchised. They do not feel the values of their parents, nor do they feel a part of their new home country, and many do not understand their religion properly. They blame government policy which fuels a strong sense of victimhood. The extremist messaging is being fed to them in six-second sound bites and it makes them believe they are absolutely justified to wage an attack. Any mental health issues then only compounds things.

There have been a variety of failed attacks, including one by a man who wanted to attack the Queen. His attack failed when he entered the wrong address into his mapping app, otherwise there is no doubt he would have tried to attack the Queen.

Additional examples of failed attacks include a copycat of the Westminster attack who drove straight up to uniformed cops armed with a four-foot sword that he would have used against them if the officers had not been ready to engage him when he drove up. An Al Qaeda sleeper cell, after five years of no concern, aimed to attack Parliament. This happened to involve the first all-female group of terrorists, including a very young bride of a Syrian fighter who was a refugee who entered the country illegally. These examples demonstrate the sheer diversity of the threat and the sheer futility of trying to profile a terrorist.


The United Kingdom has 3,000 open subjects of interest with 20,000 that have been closed. Two of our recent successful attacks (London and Manchester) were carried out by closed subjects of interest. Just since March 2017, there have been 5 attacks, 9 disruptions, and 36 victim deaths.

The Westminster bridge attack in March 2017 was carried out by a 52-year-old man who was a closed subject of interest who was never expected to become an attack planner or threat, but it was thought he may have been on the fringes of a terrorist cell. His attack took just 82 seconds to kill 5 people and it is believed he was ultimately trying to get into Parliament. He had purchased two carving knives on March 9 in Birmingham and hired a vehicle at Enterprise Rent a Car from March 16<sup>th</sup>-



**Deputy Assistant Commissioner  
Neil Basu**

22<sup>nd</sup>. He sent a PDF to family and associates immediately prior to the attack which signaled some of his intentions, and he visited his estranged parents and mother who had terminal illness. He was planning to attack earlier, but something caused him to delay it. It is still not known why he carried out the attack. He was an extremist, but there was no previous clue he had a plan to execute an attack. He was a mixed-race person who grew up in a mostly white area, and was estranged from his daughter and second wife, but that is not a unique characteristic. His success has inspired and incited others.



There has been some learning to come out of this attack with 15 separate reviews conducted. The subsequent investigations and incident response have had to account messaging between the attacker and 12 of his friends, handling multiple victims, attending to the welfare of officers and staff involved in the attack and response, and handling multiple crime scenes including the seat of government. As a backdrop to all this, the press was making up stories and talking about how the attack was not prevented. The beast of the media has to be fed.


The Manchester attack was carried out by a 22-year-old second generation British man who thought he was a Libyan freedom fighter. The explosion at a concert involved a five-kilogram IED that was placed in a canister that had a picture of the Queen on the outside. It was timed to go off when people were leaving the Arianna Grande concert and resulted in 22 people being killed, many of whom were young girls and their mothers with the youngest victim being eight years old. The attacker had traveled many times to Libya with his brother and family. Libya had never been a country where travel was blocked. The attacker and his family had been investigated before but were not considered an attack and extremist threat. There had been a suspicious activity reported about them, but it was not considered credible at the time. That is now being looked at again. There are 2,000 people who have been involved in investigating this attack, which is a large part of the force, and required a lot of specialist skills from personnel in London. The investigation involved looking at 64 other individuals and considering dozens of potential conspiracies, which ultimately required appointing five counter terrorism commanders with special forces support to conduct a manhunt and arrest those individuals. Additionally, there was 16 terabytes of data to manage and mine, 16 hours of closed circuit television (CCTV) footage to view, and eight million lines of phone data to analyze. This was all in addition to providing support to a city in shock.



The attack on the London Bridge and Borough Market killed eight people and were targets because they are crowded places. The original target may have been Oxford Street which would likely have resulted in much higher casualties, but the roads were blocked to traffic that day, so they changed their plan. The attackers were known ALM extremists. The media played their footage repeatedly, which should not happen because it provides perfect propaganda for the terrorists. One attacker was an Italian national known by Italian officials for criminal reasons, but not for terrorism concerns. Another attacker was a Moroccan national who was an illegal immigrant to the United Kingdom who had never been tracked down by immigration. The other was a British national. There were precursors to the attack that were never identified because they were everyday activities - they rented the van the same day conducted the attack, they bought the knives as £2.99 bargains, and they constructed fake suicide vests. They thought someone was going to build suicide vests for them, but that did not happen. After running people down with the van, they got out and started stabbing people in the market. They had Molotov cocktails, but decided not to use them. Victims of the attack were from across the world which increased the difficulty of handling the press and family notifications, but ultimately ended up helping the public to support the response.

The Finsbury Park attacker was unknown to authorities for terrorism or domestic extremism concerns. This was another attack that involved a rented vehicle running over people and resulted in 15 people being injured. The attacker got stuck in traffic, so missed his original target of a large gathering of Muslims. This attack points to the need for officials to be aware of possible far-right attackers. We need to treat any violent attacks of extremism the same, whether they are white supremacists or affiliates of foreign terrorist organizations.

The Parsons Green Tube attack was carried out by a young Iraqi refugee, which thankfully involved no fatalities, but there were 55 injured victims. The subway system was packed with people and the bomb was two kilograms of TATP, but luckily the bomb did not detonate properly after the attacker left it with a timing device. If it had gone off with its full capabilities it would have killed or maimed everyone on the Tube since they are open and not compartmentalized. The attacker is a refugee the government was trying to help. One of the lessons learned from the response to this attack was that it is absolutely important




to know how to gain access to key transportation system data outside of normal business hours, including gaining access to CCTV footage. There may be data systems that are downloaded in the middle of the night, during which time there may be no way for gaining access. The response was criticized for not releasing CCTV footage, but there would have been too many false identifications that would have had to be tracked down. The attacker is now facing trial for attempted murder.

The review of these five attacks is likely the most exhaustive review of counter terrorism efforts ever in the country's history. While there may be areas for doing much better, including in the Pursue element, it has to be remembered that this is a democracy. We have to do better at identifying the real priorities and there has to be a better system to prioritize the threat. There are three big changes that are needed. The first relates to data and the need to identify the re-engagement of threats that were thought closed. It is not necessarily about gathering more data to be able to identify this, but it is about needing the right data sets and the right questions to ask of the data. Maybe there is an opportunity to analyze and interpret the data through artificial intelligence and machine learning. There is also a need for a national multi-agency clearinghouse for multi-agency data sharing. This will require a massive cultural change, since the security sector does not typically release information, but it will result in better decision making. Additionally, there is a need for stronger border control that includes stronger biometrics.

The Prevent mission is constantly under criticism, but it needs to be eighty-five percent of our efforts and look towards protecting the weak. Where prevention fails, we have to be bold enough that a single failure does not mean the approach is a failure. The reporting of suspicious activities around the purchase of precursor chemicals has not been working, but there are plenty of other efforts that need to continue or be adopted. A continuing effort is making it difficult for aspiring foreign fighters to travel by taking away their passports. Institutions that are at risk for radicalization need to be empowered with counter messaging or they need to be shut down. There also needs to be a continuing effort to target hate on the Internet and get large companies to embrace that effort. Laws need to change to require healthcare workers to report concerns about their patients being radicalized. The private sector desperately wants to help and there needs to be a way to get them and communities playing a larger role, including involving them in the "Run, Hide, Tell" campaign. An educated and prepared community is more likely to be able to defeat terrorism.





## Protecting Crowded Places

- ▶ Michael Downing, Chief Security Officer, Oak View Group – Facilitator
- ▶ Danny Chan, Regional Director, Marriott International Inc.
- ▶ John Yates, Director of Security, Scentre Group and Westfield Corporation
- ▶ Hon. Robert Doyle AC, Lord Mayor of Melbourne, City of Melbourne

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways


- ✓ Large public gathering places, including stadiums and malls need to be hardened and need to incorporate advanced technologies.
- ✓ Private partners with large venues need to develop leaders that can adapt to these changing threats and develop highly trained staff that can react to threat activities.
- ✓ It is important to have an internal focus on preparing staff, including how they handle a surge capacity and communications.
- ✓ Exercises must be realistic and meaningful and address how to really engage and quickly share real-time intelligence.
- ✓ Invite community members to events at the venue to help them feel like a partner in maintaining the safety of the community.
- ✓ International hotel chains should make contact with each guest at least once every 24 hours.
- ✓ Security checklists and independent auditors can make sure every venue in a private company meets the same standard.
- ✓ We are only as good as the people delivering the security, so they need the appropriate training or skills.

The threat has evolved from targeting of military, police, and infrastructure to aiming at soft targets in public places. There are not enough resources to surveil everyone and not all places will allow it. Today's threats are greater than yesterday and continue to evolve at alarming rates. A decentralized threat cannot be defeated with a centralized approach. Large public gathering places, including stadiums and malls need to be hardened and need to incorporate advanced technologies. The private partners that manage these venues need to develop leaders that can adapt to these changing threats and develop highly trained staff that can react to threat activities.



L – R: Hon. Robert Doyle AC, Danny Chan and John Yates





The City of Melbourne experienced an attack on January 20, 2017 when a man drove a vehicle down a pedestrian street during a busy Friday lunchtime, killing six people and injuring and traumatizing many others. Among those killed was a three-month old baby. This marked a turning point for Melbourne and only hard work between the private sector and government is going to be able to address this threat.


For an international corporation that manages multiple shopping centers around the world, the security approach takes on a global perspective, employing the same Four Ps approach as the United Kingdom. Addressing the threat of a terrorist attack is the top priority and the approach is based on the sharing of lessons learned with public and private partners, which is based on having developed trusting relationships. Part of this has been through embedding leaders in each other's organizations. An attack on any private partners hurts everyone. It is important to have an internal focus on preparing staff, including how they handle a surge capacity and communications. One of the biggest challenges is being able to maintain proper communications with each retail shop since personnel is constantly changing. Exercises must be realistic and meaningful and address how to really engage and quickly share real-time intelligence. Embracing technology requires a balanced approach considering the potential cost to privacy and freedom.

The challenge for a large public venue is to know who everyone is within 100 meters around the location. A few private companies mandate counter surveillance by using plain clothes personnel to blend in among the other visitors. Community engagement then provides the link with the community that surrounds the venue who will be the most likely to know if something or someone is suspicious. One approach is to invite community members to events at the venue to help them feel like a partner in maintaining the safety of the community. This public private partnership is the only way to prevent the next attack. It also helps to learn from the experiences of others who have experienced an attack or a similar threat.



**Q:** With the events in Las Vegas, how would Marriott have intervened or have been able to be in a position that would have alerted the authorities to prevent the attack?

**A:** We did a lot of thinking after Las Vegas. We have many hotels on the strip. I think the most important thing for an international hotel chain is that at least every 24 hours we must have contact with the guest. If the guest puts a do not disturb sign on the door, we have to consider how we make contact. The room keeper should knock on the room and if there is no response, then a call should be made to room. Then the duty manager and security go knock on the door and go in the room to verify the guest is still alive and fine. This alone can help. The bigger problem is to ensure consistency across locations. Every month each site officer is required to go through a checklist. Then an independent body audits each hotel's compliance with this process and uses the same checklist. This compliance is required from every hotel.




**Q:** Considering attacks that occurred in Manchester and Las Vegas and weaponized drones, should we have sniper nests and overwatch capabilities? Does this blur the lines between local law enforcement and private security?

**A:** Those tactics are now accepted. In Turkey, you will queue for about 30 minutes to go through security before you can drive your car into a venue. In Israel, people are wanded before they can enter a mall. We should not underestimate the public and their appetite for safety. The public understands better than anyone that we are in a different world. Convenience over safety does not work anymore, but we must still respect individual privacy and rights. We are not very good about explaining to the public what we are doing and why. I think people are ready for that. Business is ready for it as well. They are now looking at retrofitting their designs for large venues to protect people. It is important on the communication side to

be the single source of truth. We rely entirely on the police for communication. These attacks do not always have to take place where there are large gatherings of people. An attack can be just as successful where there are smaller gatherings of people. It is important to practice these events with staff regularly. One way of doing this is running tests by placing a suspicious bag and seeing how long it takes for it to be reported. We have to resort to shaming when these do not quickly get detected, but now personnel are looking out for those items and they realize anyone can be a subject.

**Q:** What are some of the opportunities in terms of human capital and the insider threat?

**A:** A huge investment is needed in security and people. We are only as good as the people delivering the security. If they do not have the appropriate training or skills, they are no good to us. We have to rethink our old strategy on security. I would prefer to have a smaller force that is more capable. We need to disrupt the standard security model without disrupting the business model of our companies. The insider threat needs to be considered. In a Jakarta bombing, a worker at a retail store brought in the explosive device to the mall. They know the security posture of the venue and can go for the weakest point. We also have to focus on the reaction side and not just prevention. We have to keep training and practicing. We want to drill the memory into the body and not just rely on the brain to react. The professionalism of law enforcement and security agencies is relied upon, but one of the most underused assets is the community. Their eyes and ears are everywhere. I do not think we are as good as we can be with engaging those communities.



# DAY TWO

## Vehicle Borne Attacks – The Couture-Rouleau Investigation

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- Claude Castonguay, Chief Superintendent / Criminal Operations Officer, Royal Canadian Mounted Police


### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ The Four Ps must all be about Prevention.
- ✓ A peace bond is a tool used in Canada that is an application made in front of a judge to ask for conditions an individual must follow during investigations while trying to find information to file charges and can include just about anything, including limiting access to the Internet.

This incident involved a low number of victims, but the victims in the offender's family also had to be considered. The attacker was born in Quebec with a normal upbringing and childhood. The attack has been considered as a bit of a copycat of the Lee Rigby murder in the United Kingdom. The father of the offender called the police department with his concern for his son's conversion to Islam and his purchase of a plane ticket to Pakistan. The son was 25 years old at the time and juvenile services had tried to help him, but they were not equipped to handle, nor was the local police department, so it fell to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to address the situation. The RCMP is like the FBI and a federal police and has the mandate to take all national security investigations. They do that in conjunction with Surete du Quebec, and Montreal in Quebec. There was a two-and-a-half months delay for the case to get to RCMP, but now that would be less likely to happen.

The attacker was not really known to police, except for a driving offense and a violence and drug related incident. He had not served any jail sentence. The investigation started by confirming the information from the father that the son had converted to Islam and intended to leave Canada, but his first attempted was prevented as a result of a snow storm. The investigation also tried to identify what he planned to do outside Canada. A peace bond is a tool used in Canada that is an application made in front of a judge to ask for conditions an individual must follow. It is a tool to use during investigations while trying to find information to file charges and can include just about anything, including limiting access to the Internet. The Canadian terrorism laws address an individual participating in activities of a terrorism group and leaving Canada or trying to leave Canada to participate in terrorist activity. There was an attempt in this investigation to find information that would show a violation of these terrorism laws.

Investigation techniques included interviewing friends, family, and a list of known associates; physical surveillance; and many judicial authorizations to sneak into his house to confirm his activities and look at data seized from his computer, including his Google searches. Further discussions with the father indicated the attacker was depressed, was separated from his wife and young son, had experienced bankruptcy associated with his small business, and had casual drug and alcohol use in his past. Since converting to Islam, he wore traditional dress, tried to convert others, and was always on the Internet looking at radical content using many different user names. Prior to his conversion he had not been a heavy computer user. He made a second attempt to travel, this time to Turkey. His name was put on the no-fly list, and authorities waited to see if he was actually going to travel. He was ultimately arrested at the airport and his phone was seized under judicial authorization. When he was interviewed, he was pretty easy going, but never confirmed he intended to travel to Turkey. His passport was seized, but there was insufficient evidence to file charges.




To prevent any future terrorist activity, an Imam was asked to spend time with the man to educate him on true Islamic teachings. During four meetings, the Imam found him to have very radical beliefs, but he seemed to show signs of being open.



During the incident, the attacker called 911 to report he had just killed a soldier. Despite this and having many police cars following him he was very calm in delivering his message to tell Canada to get out of the Daesh conflict. During the continuing pursuit he tried to run down an officer, but lost control of his car and overturned it in a ditch alongside the road. Another officer tried to help the attacker out of his car until she realizes he has a knife. He is ultimately shot by the officer he tried to run down when he went after other officers with the knife.

The investigation after the incident tried to find other affiliates, associates, or potential travelers who could confirm the attacker's intentions. No signs of his intentions were ever found. With the experience from this incident the Four Ps must all be about Prevention. There could have been more time spent on prevention.



## Vehicle Borne Attacks – Bastille Day in Nice 2016

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► Elodie Robin, Commissaire de Police – Superintendent, Head of Police District – Romans Sur Isere

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways


- ✓ Saving the injured cannot be the main goal of responding police, rather they have to look at preventing a possible secondary attack.
- ✓ A safe place will need to be identified on the scene for leadership and politicians to provide regular updates on what happened and what police measures were being taken.
- ✓ Someone must be identified to establish and manage a meeting point to identify where backup is needed and when there were enough people on scene to be able to handle the situation.
- ✓ Leadership should look at things globally and not get too involved in the details.
- ✓ It is important to take the press to a safe place, so they will not prevent you from doing your job, and they can be informed that regular updates will be provided.
- ✓ After the response is wrapped up it is important to continue to take care of your people and provide psychological support
- ✓ It is important to think of managing staff over the long run since the response could last for days.

It is helpful to share the details of a response to an attack, including what was done well and what could have been improved. Bastille Day celebrations in France involve fireworks and military parades in every city in France. The event in Nice had many people gathering along a three to four kilometer stretch along the seaside. There were two security perimeters for this event. The first was meant to prevent traffic from entering the area and was organized by the municipal police. There was also a National Police perimeter and these police carried protective weapons. The attack truck started driving along the seaside about two kilometers before he arrived at the municipal police roadblock, which he bypassed and then made it to the National Police roadblock. The police at this roadblock did not know at first if they were just dealing a drunken driver, but when the truck bypassed them they then followed him and shot him. They shot about 80 rounds in killing him. There were 25,000 people and more than 160 police on the Promenade des Anglais, and the attack resulted in 86 dead and 432 wounded.

The loud live music and fireworks at the scene made it hard for the crowd to hear the truck barreling through. The attack began at 10:35pm - five minutes after the start of the fireworks – and the driver was killed at 10:40pm. At 2am, the Ministry of Interior arrived, and additional politicians began arriving, which is an element of the response that must be considered.

When the first reports of the incident were heard on the radio, the initial reaction was that someone was lost and drove through the barriers until officers were seen running and shots were heard. Then reports started to come in of many people being dead. There was a stampede of people at the scene running away from the truck. Relatives of the wounded and dead were desperately looking for emergency services. A security perimeter was set up right away and the explosives team was called in right away in case the truck had explosives for a secondary attack. There were also many rumors of hostage takers and shootings in other parts of the area. The police on the scene could not wait for special forces to arrive. They did not have much time to understand what was happening and react.

The distribution of command was spontaneous with the goal of bringing organization to the emergency services already on the scene. The security perimeter was very large for so few officers to manage and since the family members did not want to leave their dead or wounded there was no real way to truly establish a security perimeter. Because of this, there was no way to be




sure there was not another terrorist or bomb on the scene. The emergency services still took the responsibility to respond even though it was not known whether there was a device on the truck that might explode. A small security zone around the truck was at least established. The police also still tried to make it easy for the emergency services to arrive to treat the victims even while maintaining a security perimeter. It is difficult for police officers to not try to save injured. Most of them do not have the training to do so and saving the injured cannot be their main goal. They have to look at preventing a possible secondary attack.

During all of this response, reports still had to be provided to leadership and a safe place had to be established for those arriving at the scene, including the Ministry of the Interior and other politicians and high-level leaders. They will need regular updates on what happened and what police measures were being taken.

About an hour after the attack the backup started to arrive, so a meeting point had to be established and there had to be a way of identifying where backup was needed and when there were enough people on scene to be able to handle the situation. Someone had to be identified to direct and manage communications and logistics at this meeting point, since regular announcements need to be made over the radio to keep everyone updated. Someone else was needed to deal with maps and to document what was happening. The judiciary police went around the scene taking names of all witnesses and those involved. The Police Director is the highest-ranking official who is located at the site, but police departments in other countries may have them operate at headquarters. They should look at things globally and not get too involved in the details.

The press will arrive to the site quickly and will want to take pictures of the scene and the wounded and dead. It is important to take the press to a safe place, so they will not prevent you from doing your job, and they can be informed that regular updates will be provided.

It was important to think of managing the staff over the long run since the response would last for days. Initially, it was important to quickly extract the officers who had shot the attacker to thank and congratulate them, but also to see if they might be in shock. The initial response team returned to the police station at 6:30am and had debriefings and gathered feedback. After the response is wrapped up it is important to continue to take care of your people and provide psychological support, which was made available around the clock for one month. Leadership also needs to take care of themselves. While receiving this support was not required, it would be a good idea if it was required, but at least the opportunity to talk is made available. Some people might feel like it shows weakness to visit a psychologist. Leadership also continued to look for opportunities to provide support and to make sure a division did not develop between those officers who on the scene during the attack and those who were not. The department needed everyone to look out for each other. Everyone who responded to the attack was asked to write a report to identify the support they needed, candidates to receive awards, and the actions they took. The department then tried to give out the awards as soon as possible. It is important to use these experiences to improve all levels of the organization. The examination of this event has led to security measures being adapted to cover big events, improvements in tactical skills, and training in first aid.



## Vehicle Borne Attacks – In Review

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- ▶ Claude Castonguay, Chief Superintendent / Criminal Operations Officer, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- ▶ Elodie Robin, Commissaire de Police – Superintendent, Head of Police District – Romans Sur Isere
- ▶ Neil Basu, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, SO15 Metropolitan Police

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Prevention is the key, including approaching rental car agents and partners in the public.
- ✓ These are difficult to interdict even if you have snipers posted and you must look at the exit routes as well.
- ✓ Marches and flower laying ceremonies are examples of things that can be done quickly to bring a sense of normalcy back to the community.
- ✓ Local police are the ones that work alongside their communities every day and they are the best to build trusting relationships that can be the basis of support after these incidents.
- ✓ Officers should be required to receive emotional support after responding to attacks.
- ✓ Leadership needs to be prepared to force personnel to step away if there is a concern they are not fit after being involved in an attack response.


**Q:** Vehicle borne attacks are not new, but they are more prevalent. It is a low tech means of terrorism. A complicated means of attack is not needed. What have we learned and what do we need to learn?

**A:** It is not new. What is disturbing is that there have been some robberies using this attack. Big events can involve a lot of mitigation against a hostile vehicle attack, but it is very difficult and expensive to do. We have to examine how we do traffic calming. Modern cars are capable of preventing people from using them as weapons, but having it implemented across all cars is a long way off. These are difficult to interdict even if you have snipers posted and you must look at the exit routes as well. Once attackers see measures have been taken, they will just look to where crowds may be exiting. Prevention is the key, including approaching rental car agents and partners in the public. Laws may prevent us from sharing names with them, but we can at least educate them on what to look for.

**Q:** What can we do in the bigger scheme of prevention? What can the public and security sector do to build those bridges with affected communities especially after a terror attack?

**A:** Prevent is very important. There is a 14-day community plan that was set up after these types of attacks, to include rapidly responding to harm that may have been caused in communities as a result of the attack. An interfaith approach is needed. Marches and flower laying ceremonies are examples of things that can be done quickly to bring a sense of normalcy back to the community. “We Stand Together” can be promoted as a way to come together with communities, emergency services, victims, and families. It should be part of a normal incident reaction. In the broader scope of prevention, we talk about outreach. There might be work to be done to avoid the us versus them feelings. The general population may not understand what it is to be Muslim. The victims can often also be Muslim. Local police are the ones that work alongside their communities every day and they are the best to build these relationships.





**Q:** It will be very difficult for parents to come to authorities. With the Canadian attack, was there anything that caused the father to make the report against his son?

**A:** There was a lot of media around people being recruited at the time. There were reports of Canadians traveling and the father was desperate to get help. His choice was seeing his son get arrested or seeing him travel to support Daesh and likely die.

**Q:** In the deradicalization process, the Canadian attacker may have shown some signs of openness. In hindsight, do you think that is something he was pretending to do? Should we look closer at these signs to see if they are real?


**A:** We cannot help but think of that now. At the time we did not think so. He actually called the Imam himself and showed some willingness to even try to understand more. Maybe we could have gone to see him every day. Once he showed openness, maybe we backed off too quickly. A case-by-case approach needs to be taken based on the reaction of the individual. He showed remorse at the airport, but maybe he was playing us.

**Q:** Did you have arrangements in place to deal with such a large number of victims initially and on an ongoing basis?

**A:** Initially after the attack there was a building that served as a meeting point for families. Several months after the attack a continuing resource was set up to provide information and support for families.

**Q:** What was the impact to the teams post attack?

**A:** We had to deal with the thought of having not done enough to prevent the attack. We tried to make it more acceptable to them that it would have been hard to prevent. We played through different scenarios. We train our officers to have a closer relationship with our prosecutors. There was a bit of a cold period in these partnerships because the prosecutors had not levied charges against the attacker which raised the thought that an earlier prosecution of the attacker could have stopped the attack. We had to work on rebuilding those relationships and making sure senior officers maintained contact with them. I feel strongly about having officers being required to have emotional support. We also need to look at the support being provided to make sure it is good enough. Our officers often feel directly responsible because they believe they have missed something or missed some piece of intelligence. You need to continue to check-in with your personnel and you need to be prepared to force people to step away if you are concerned they are not fit.



## Victim Approaches – During the Incident – Post the Incident – Ongoing

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
- ▶ Peter Sparks, Detective Chief Inspector, Metropolitan Police
- ▶ Mary Fetchet, Executive Director, Voices of September 11th
- ▶ Levent Altan, Executive Director, Victim Support Europe

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ One of the most important first steps is to quickly identify who has been affected by an attack and the level of priority for support.
- ✓ Family liaison officers can be deployed to bereaved families of the deceased and those with life-threatening and life changing injuries.
- ✓ There need to be victim support experts within the response system and they need to be included in training and exercises.
- ✓ The infrastructure to provide support to victims needs to be able to be stood up quickly after an incident, which includes a physical staging and gathering location, a way to manage monetary donations, and a communications system.
- ✓ Victim definitions should be established in advance, to be able to determine the level of support that will be provided.
- ✓ Establishing a protocol for protection of victim data can ensure data only gets to those who will provide support desired by the victim.
- ✓ Support from peers who have been through similar incidents helps to establish an immediate level of mutual understanding and can be a long-term resource.
- ✓ Establishing partnerships with health and social workers is an important part of supporting victims.

It is important to look in advance at what preparations have been taken and what organizations are in place to ensure people affected by major incidents will be cared for. This also includes knowing what victim support personnel will be there to provide immediate advice to the senior investigator. One of the most important first steps is to quickly identify who has been affected by an attack. Family liaison officers can be deployed to bereaved families of the deceased and those with life-threatening and life changing injuries. This can include making contact with family members of the suspect through contact with officers. Witnesses are prioritized in different tiers, with tier 1 noting witnesses who saw the attacks, tier 2 witnesses who saw the suspect or car but did not witness attack, and then tier 3 are those witnesses who were in the area. The magnitude of an attack could result in only being able to immediately handle tier one witnesses. Affected persons can include the deceased and their family, injured, witnesses, those in area, first responders, public transport workers, local authority workers, local business workers, and tourists. When foreign deceased are involved, then embassies have to be notified. In the long term, it is still important to consider how witnesses in tier 2 and 3 categories will be addressed.

Victim Support Europe (VSE) supports organizations that support victims of crime and disasters. Their membership spans 26 mostly European countries. They also carry out a lot of advocacy work throughout Europe, fill in the gaps in support provided through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the European Union, and fulfill requests from local victim organizations. The level of support provided to victims is highly variable depending on the country. The best response tends to be where NGOs are integrated into crisis response and long-term support and where a country already has a national victims support service. Victim Support Europe also serves many foreign victims, which poses additional challenges, including language barriers and their lack of knowledge of their rights. Victim Support Europe usually initiates support by contacting NGOs and then pairing victims with support resources. Recently, VSE worked with police after the Westminster attack.



**Detective Chief Inspector  
Peter Sparks**


The support provided by VSE really changed after helping with the attacks on the Bataclan theater and throughout Paris. The organization started to take more of a networked approach to the support provided, including something as simple as a monthly conference call to help keep the group together. The organization also looked at what is needed to support victims of terrorism compared to other victims of crime. A lot of the situations addressed now are about mass scale attacks. Each country might have a different set of victim types they can consider in advance, which might include members from the private sector. There are layers of victims, including the direct victim who are present or harmed in the attack. The second layer includes the family, loved ones, immediate witnesses, and first responders. The third layer includes the community and wider population. It is important to understand the needs of each of these sets of victims. Common needs include being shown respect and recognition which might be accomplished by politicians making public statements; feeling protected from further physical attack or from secondary victimization; having sources of support; feeling justice is being served; and receiving compensation.

There need to be victim support experts within the response system and they need to be included in training and exercises. The infrastructure to provide support to victims needs to be able to be stood up quickly after an incident, which includes a physical staging and gathering location, a way to manage monetary donations, and a communications system. Victim definitions should be established in advance, to be able to determine the level of support that will be provided. Establishing a protocol for protection of victim data can ensure data only gets to those who will provide support desired by the victim. Support from peers who have been through similar incidents helps to establish an immediate level of mutual understanding and can be a long-term resource. An information sharing and communications plan is vital to keep victims and the public informed. A fast and reliable single trusted source is needed that can communicate information that is sensitive to the needs of the victims. A single website can provide a public and private space for updates. Family assistance centers and victim navigators can help with the burden of getting information for the family and how to interact with media or social media outlets. Victims' needs change over time and their realization that they may need support may take a while, so their initial refusal of support should not prevent future outreach. Some countries may have a requirement for gaining consent before offering different types of support, so coordination between countries can help to address needs of foreign victims.



**Mary Fetchet**

In the response to the 9/11 attacks, there were many differences between the three attack sites. In New York City, there was a tidal wave of toxic dust that went through the city. The cleanup continued for over 8 months and was the largest crime scene the United States had ever experienced, with 20,000 human remains found. However, only 1,640 of the over 2,900 victims who died have had remains discovered. The notification process to families will continue indefinitely with the over 8,000 body parts the medical examiner still has to identify, which means families will continue to be impacted.




The Voices of September 11 was founded to provide information and support; to commemorate the lives lost; and promote public policy to make the public safer. The early work of the organization included disseminating accurate information, developing programs based on the ongoing assessment of needs, and coordinating support for victims. Establishing partnerships with health and social workers has been an important part of this. Victims are defined broadly to include the victim, the victim's family and extended family, evacuees, survivors, witnesses, and the impacted community. The organization has continued to hold conferences each year to meet the needs of families and to be a voice for change and was an early advocate for many of the 9/11 Commission reforms. More recently a Voices of Experience Training Program was established that includes a resource kit available online. Commemoration is an important part of healing, which has included working with all of the families to incorporate the stories of all of the victims in the 9/11 Memorial.

Families are looking for a standardized process for the notification of remains and for families to be able to choose how they are notified. There also continue to be long-term challenges for victims, including triggers that cause resurfacing of trauma, single parenthood, relationship issues, finding continuing support, financial issues, medical conditions, subsequent losses, and mental health conditions. A grant from the Canadian government, has enabled research to understand how the needs of victims evolve. Separately, a World Trade Center responder support program is continuing to help support those with disorders they contracted from responding which include cancer, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and respiratory disorders. Over 1,600 responders have died since 9/11 from these conditions. One-third of them had psychological disorders in the early period after event (some of which were preexisting), and one in five developed a new psychological disorder.



The support provided by victim service organizations can apply to terrorist attacks or large-scale disasters. It is only through organizations like LinCT that we can work together to help the victims, responders, and their families.



## The Coroner – Case Studies and the Prevention Context

- ▶ Tracy Linford, Assistant Commissioner, Queensland Police Service - Facilitator
- ▶ Judge Sara Hinchey, Victorian State Coroner, Coroners Court of Victoria
- ▶ Judge Nicholas Loraine-Smith, Circuit Judge, Southwark Crown Court
- ▶ Dr. Elizabeth Brooks-Lim, Chief Medical Examiner, Edmonton, Alberta

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways


- ✓ The Coroner should be included in any briefings to media and senior leaders, especially when they address information about the number of victims.
- ✓ Coroners and police need to understand each other's roles, especially when identifying opportunities for prevention.
- ✓ A closer ongoing working relationship with law enforcement will help the Coroner to have better and more targeted questioning during investigations and encourages cooperation during an investigation.
- ✓ Establishing a close working relationship between police and the Coroner can help to identify the scope of an inquest early and have it be driven by issues identified by the police.
- ✓ The needs of the families of victims should be kept in mind throughout an inquest.
- ✓ Coroners need to be prepared for diverse ethnic communities and remote and difficult to access areas.
- ✓ There needs to be a strong partnership with the security and intelligence network since Coroners are specialists in injury pattern recognition and death mechanisms, which can help to quickly identify offenders and find specific, telling evidence, like if a biological agent has been used.
- ✓ Coroners have great relationships with the health department and health care community, so they can help connect the intelligence and health community and they can lock down sensitive information when needed.

It is vital for law enforcement to understand the important role played by Coroners and medical examiners and what they can do to help. While there will be a criminal investigation after an incident, there may also be issues raised about the response or how the doctors treated an attacker or victims. Someone might ask if something was done at the hospital that contributed to their death.



Assistant Commissioner Tracy  
Linford


In Victoria, there are about 45,000 deaths each year, about 6,500 of these are reported to the Coroner, and 100 of these go into an inquest. All of this is handled by an office of 10 Coroners. If there are many victims, there are others in the Coroners Court available to assist. The Coroner plays dual roles, with the immediate role following an incident being about victim identification and the other role is as investigator, which can also include a prevention role. The Coroner should be included in any briefings to media and senior leaders, especially when they address information about the number of victims. Coroners and police need to understand each other's roles, especially when identifying opportunities for prevention. A closer ongoing working relationship with law enforcement will help the Coroner to have better and more targeted questioning during investigations and encourages cooperation during an investigation. The focus of an inquest will likely be on practice and procedure rather than actions of individuals. An investigative Coroner will attend the scene of any police contact death. A Coroner's power to direct the course of their investigation will be exercised in consultation with the lead agency at the scene, with items seized by the Coroner able to be shared back with the police. The hope is



to maintain ongoing communications. The more the police can tell Coroners from the outset about the facts and circumstances around the death, the better the outcome will be for all concerned.

With good relationships between the Coroner and the homicide squad they can walk through a crime scene together to learn key facts and to understand the importance of not rushing into a scene. This can also help to identify the scope of an inquest early and have it be driven by issues identified by the police. An inquest can concentrate on relevant policies and procedures with a view on making recommendations for improvement. A close relationship can also help in incidents, like a terrorist incident, when there are ongoing and sensitive security issues. The police can then be trusting enough with of the Coronal investigation to share those details.

A recent example of a large scale Coronal investigation involved an attack on a Tunisian hotel that was primarily used by tourists and was targeted by an individual trained at a camp in Libya. Among the dead were British nationals, which resulted in a formal inquest by the British government. The intention of the attacker was to shoot as many Western tourists as possible, with no concern for his own survival. There was very little security at the hotel to prevent or stop the shooting that began on the beach and continued into the outdoor pool area, the first floor of the hotel, and the parking lot. It was about a 30-minute-long incident that ended with the shooter walking back to the beach, throwing his cell phone into the sea, and then walking back inland where he was shot. The response from the hotel security and the Tunisian police was not impressive. There were three unarmed guards in the hotel who all ran. Two Tunisian police on the beach did not respond and others hesitated to enter the hotel grounds. A division of the tourism security police were two minutes away, but they decided to go back to the police station for eight minutes before heading to the scene and then decided to not even go into the hotel. The Tunisian National Guard is the group that eventually responded and shot the terrorist. The attack succeeded in its goal of devastating the Tunisian tourist industry.



Judge Sara Hinchey

Within three hours of the attack the British police response began with the establishment of a family liaison team and officers being quickly dispatched to Tunisia. British police made multiple return trips to conduct investigations. While the investigations uncovered a lot of video online and through other sources, a lot of the CCTV footage was never obtained. Additionally, there was a large amount of data obtained from the mobile phones of the gunman and others and from interviews. The report done by the Tunisian government also provided many details, which proved to be greatly important to the families.




Judge Nicholas Loraine-Smith

The hearings conducted by the British government in London were connected with other courtrooms throughout the country through video links, so families could easily watch. Families were kept in mind throughout the inquest and they were keep informed through secure communication forums and other secure sites. It can be very upsetting to families if information is publicly released before they are made aware, so information had to be very carefully controlled. Families were told at least two months in advance of the day the death of their family member would be addressed in the hearings and about one to two hours was spent on each death. Long breaks were taken when necessary to help families better handle the information. At the request of the families, no photographs were shown of the dead bodies. Also, families were not required to provide any evidence. The families wanted to know how quickly their relatives died and if the attack could have been prevented. The families appreciated the support they received from other families and having their day in court.

The inquest addressed security in place at the hotel and any changes made following the attack, and what was known by the government and the travel company about the risks of an attack on that hotel. Computer-aided modeling with 3D imaging of the location and event were valuable tools for conveying this information. The inquest found that neither the British nor Tunisian governments had any information about the possibility of the attack on the hotel. The travel company was criticized






that they did not tell travelers about another attack in Tunisia that took place shortly before the trip. The ruling was that all 30 were unlawfully killed and the families appreciated that public determination.

There are variations in how Coroners are structured. While all investigate sudden deaths, not all have the strong focus on examining prevention opportunities. Canadian Coroners speak for the dead to protect the living, examining the who, what, where, and how of a death. They also provide a service to families at the worst time in their lives. The powers of the Coroner may include entering a location without a warrant and seizing anything related to a death. Any police officer or investigator can be designated as officers of the Coroner and information can be shared back and forth between police and the Coroner. Every jurisdiction will have a different capacity and capability, which can be stressed during holiday closures, facility renovations, or by limited resources in a small rural jurisdiction. These incidents will create attention and pressure from the media, but grieving families still need to be considered, which has included providing translators for immigrant populations.

An example of a rural incident that required a creative solution involved the shooting of four victims in a small town in Saskatchewan with a population of 2,600. The shooter was a 17-year-old who shot two people at a school and another two at a house near the school. There was only one person in the town to handle autopsies and the four deaths were overwhelming. The solution identified was to bring in a nearby Coroner, but from another province. This required a lot of bureaucratic processing of licensing, an interprovincial government agreement, and insurance, but it was an example of the bureaucracy working quickly to enable the solution. This incident showed the need to be prepared for diverse ethnic communities and remote and difficult to access areas.




Partnerships throughout the country are needed to be able to ensure quick response in these incidents. Additionally, there needs to be a strong partnership with the security and intelligence network since Coroners are specialists in injury pattern recognition and death mechanisms, which can help to quickly identify offenders and find specific, telling evidence. If there is specific biological agent used, it will most likely be identified by an emergency room first. Coroners have great relationships with the health department and health care community, so they can help connect the intelligence and health community and they can lock down sensitive information when needed. The Coroner can also potentially be in a position to make public recommendations following deaths. While the recommendations have no legal bearing, they can raise awareness of key issues and can be used to influence change, including influencing and shaping legislation since they are independent and non-partisan advisors to government.

**Q:** How are Coroners and medical examiners preparing for terrorist attacks and mass casualties?

**A:** This is not something that was on our radar. We do deal with mass casualties. We are used to seeing dead people all the time in very violent deaths. I am taking this to our forum to talk about and consider. We need a national response team among Coroners and medical examiners. We need to be more closely knit. We are very well resourced in Victoria for responding to mass casualties. What worries me is how we will be able to deal with public hysteria and media response that follows these types of incidents. It was good that we already knew each other across agencies to be able to respond to these demands. Our Court needs to get more up to date with media reaction. We could use a template for how we respond, especially with how we release victim lists.





## Fixated Threat and Grievance Fueled Violence: A Mental Health Approach

- ▶ John Parkinson, Chairman, Centre for Excellence for Research into Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence & Organised Crime
- ▶ Frank Farnham, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, North London Forensic Service
- ▶ Dr. Michele Pathe, Forensic Psychiatrist, Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Mental health liaison programs can help police screen, prioritize, assess, and manage individuals of concern.
- ✓ A field question card to help police identify when a mental health condition might be present and how to handle.
- ✓ Socially isolated and mentally unstable individuals are particularly vulnerable to extremist messaging so, lone actor attacks can be reduced by improving mental and behavior treatment.
- ✓ Find a way to support vulnerable individuals – the shy, lonely, and bullied 18-year-old – before they get to the point that they turn to the extremist messaging.
- ✓ Proactive strategies for potential lone actors can prevent progression to violence, regardless of the basis for their grievance.


The United Kingdom maintains a large database of worrying cases. There are over 5,000 case files on people who have made threats to the British royal family. Of those, 83.3 percent showed clear evidence of serious mental health issues. We conducted an analysis of attacks on politicians as a way to better understand how to identify which threats from individuals with a mental health disorder might have the possibility of violence. Of 24 attacks identified, 13 of the attackers had mental health disorders; 11 of the cases demonstrated warning signs that were not subtle, including taking out newspaper advertisements, telling friends, and putting up posters. These individuals were fixated on highly personal quests for justice. To address these types of cases, the Fixated Threat Assessment Center (FTAC) was established to identify and divert people presenting a risk. Referred individuals are put through a preliminary screening, which helps inform an initial assessment and the allocation of a priority level (high, moderate, low). High and moderate cases are taken on for case management, review, and supervision. Diversion activities include trying to connect the at-risk individual with family and social services that can include making home or hospital visits. Of the first 100 cases, 83 percent were taken on by local mental health services or admitted to the hospital.



John Parkinson

There is an overlap between what FTAC is doing and what could be done with lone actors. In recent lone actor cases, they may not have killed a lot of people in total, but they have a real impact on public morale. Of the lone actors in the United Kingdom, 34 percent were associated with Al Qaeda, 33 percent were right-wing extremists, and 33 percent were concerned with a single issue. There is also a link between lone actors and mental illness, with 41 percent affected, according to the Gill Report. Lone actors are noted as being more likely to have a history of mental health issues than individuals associated with a terrorist group. While less than one percent of the general community has schizophrenia, about 12 percent of lone and group actors are affected. Lone actors with mental disorders are more likely to show planning behaviors and ideological interactions.

Seemingly suicidal terrorists are not truly suicidal. Suicide is just a part of the script of grievance, alienation, depression, despair, a desire to end it all, and a desire for revenge. Those who are aggrieved of their social status are attracted to the ideas of radical issue groups as a means of expressing a feeling of victimization and discontent.



Addressing mental health issues is increasingly accepted as a significant factor in the core business of policing. Within the United Kingdom Prevent program, there are efforts to support counter terrorism police in liaising effectively with mental health services and diversion programs and providing advice-related referrals. The mental health liaison programs can help police screen, prioritize, assess, and manage individuals of concern. They can also get police started with some simple things like a field question card to help identify when a mental health condition might be present and how to handle. It provides a structured professional way to screen, assess, prioritize, and manage questionable people. Of 175 total referrals received, about half are related to Islamist extremism; 14 percent of those had never been known to mental health services. In some of the examined cases, families had been asking for help but there was nowhere for them to be supported. This effort attempts to address that gap. Ethical questions have been raised about whether this approach adds further stigma to mental health conditions.

While lone actor attacks are increasing, not all lone actor attacks are driven by extremism. They may be individuals with an axe to grind and can frame their grievance in extremist ideology. Socially isolated and mentally unstable individuals are particularly vulnerable to extremist messaging. With this in mind, lone actor attacks can be reduced by improving mental and behavior treatment. The lesson is to get alongside these types of individuals – the shy, lonely, and bullied 18-year-old – before they get to the point that they turn to the extremist messaging. They are a diverse group, but they all have in common the “lone-actor, grievance-fueled violence” with some underpinning sense of injustice, loss, and injury. A fixation is an intense preoccupation with a person or cause that is pursued to an abnormally obsessive or pathological degree.




Frank Farnham

The most concerning people are those with a grievance against a cause, who are most likely to harm themselves, the community, and public figures and their staff in Western nations. Their ideology is usually highly idiosyncratic and not widely shared; and they are never integrated into a group, often shunned by other groups, and many are mentally ill. Neither law enforcement or mental health services alone are able to assess or manage the risks in these cases. It requires a joint solution. The FTAC in Victoria has mental health personnel embedded in police intelligence units. Initially, the screening is done by frontline referrers using an assessment tool that is a checklist for what should be referred to the FTAC. The FTAC brings together police intelligence and mental health to assess an individual’s risk (low, medium, high) and develop plans for interventions for those at medium and high risk levels. For many individuals who are referred, it is about treating untreated mental health issues, with quite a large number having some serious disorder where they have lost touch with reality. They could be outwardly seemingly normal unless paired with their behavior patterns. It is important to realize that mental illness does not preclude the capability for someone to plan and carry out attack.



Dr. Michele Pathé

Lone actor terrorism has a lot of similarities to those targeting officials. There is a strong component of personal grievance, desire to be recognized, and higher rates of mental illness. Forty percent of lone actors have mental health illness, as opposed to eight percent of group actor terrorists. While a person can be assessed as a low risk to be a terrorist, they can be assessed at a high risk as a fixated individual. Proactive strategies for potential lone actors can prevent progression to violence, regardless of the basis for their grievance.




## Countering Violent Extremism – Contemporary Options

- ▶ Anna Parle, Chief Resilience Officer, Department of Premier and Cabinet – Facilitator
- ▶ Dr. Sajjan Gohel, International Security Director, Asia-Pacific Foundation
- ▶ Dr. Mehreen Farooq, Vice President, World Organisation for Resource Development and Education
- ▶ Dr. Kate Barrelle, CVE Consultant and Chief Impact Officer, STREAT


### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Collaboration is the key to countering violent extremism.
- ✓ There is a stage where intervention is possible to get children being radicalized integrated back into society, but it is hard to then counter the Daesh message that is constantly being broadcast.
- ✓ Public private partnerships are underused, and law enforcement needs to better understand who their partners are in the private sector.
- ✓ Law enforcement can consider how to incorporate countering violent extremism into community policing, homeland security, and emergency response.
- ✓ Intervention needs to focus on how we are increasing public awareness; increasing referrals for social services by increasing easier referral protocols; and integrating existing tools into treating violent extremism so communities know where to turn for help.
- ✓ Disengagement can focus on keeping a door open to family; expanding peer networks through things like sports or volunteering; assisting in mending relationships; and providing mentoring or supportive guidance.
- ✓ Coping capabilities can be developed by helping an individual address anxiety, depression, trauma, and drug or alcohol abuse.
- ✓ Mapping out an individual's circle of support can help them understand their identity and their available resources.
- ✓ Show individuals other ways for making an impact besides using violence, since a person's mind does not need to be changed to change their behavior.


There is no one size fits all for meeting the challenges of CVE. Successful CVE approaches include policing, policy making, multi-cultural affairs, and mental health services, which means collaboration is the key.



The ideology behind the violence that is used to build the narratives to radicalize and recruit and plan tactics and targets may not be very sophisticated. As the territory held by Daesh declines, their options are decreasing, and they may be increasingly ready to attack. Calling them Daesh rather than the Islamic State undermines their brand, since it does not recognize their hold of any territory. The Daesh radicalization messaging is meant to appeal to all types, including thrill and adventure seekers. They also see some as low-value foot soldiers that will likely get killed in the process. Whether they are ideologists, who come from troubled backgrounds, or are educated and popular they all end up buying into the narrative of religiously-justified terrorism that uses severe brutality. As Daesh has become more desperate, they are now trying to groom children into carrying out terrorism. There is a stage where intervention is possible to get these children integrated back into society, but it is hard to then counter the Daesh message that is constantly being broadcast.



Daesh is also very skilled at overcoming efforts to prevent their message from getting out. The intelligence unit of Daesh, Emni, is able to wage high impact low sophisticated attacks. Known as the Emni Cycle, they push their message online for it to then be pushed below the surface into dark websites, often seen by people known as Inghimas who are trying to kill as many police officers as possible and they are willing to die in process. Daesh has developed an honor board to recognize cop killers. The Rumiya magazine also continues to provide guidance on how to wage attacks, including using vehicles and then a secondary weapon like a gun or knife. Despite its losses of territory, Daesh is trying to continue its narrative using fake news. They are also developing online apps and games for children to play where they choose the target to explode which might include the Statue of Liberty, the Eiffel Tower, or Big Ben. This is where Prevent is very important and can help to identify those who have the potential to get radicalized. Daesh may have an appealing presentation that tries to push a message of pure and unadulterated Islam that satisfies a need for identity and purpose. The reality is they are a deceptive group with messaging that corrupts the body and brain, is unfulfilling, and is hazardous to a person's health. The most powerful weapon we have is the truth, which is that Daesh kills Muslims en masse all the time and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is actually just an administrative secretary, not a religious scholar.



**Dr. Saijan Gohel**




**Dr. Mehreen Farooq**


The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) is a nonprofit, educational, and community building program started about four years ago with the Montgomery County Police Department. It was designed to increase the role of citizens in public safety and engage with those who are at-risk before they commit a crime. It is focused on broad community engagement and based on research that indicates the impact of violent extremism is not just to those searching out the messaging. An international cultural center has been established to avoid stigmatizing any one group and help to create an early warning network and empower the community. The program has used case studies in community awareness briefings to show the major clusters of risk factors, including economic, ideological, and grievances. They are also meant to emphasize that religion is not the problem, but it is people who are increasingly agitated.

To help spread this message, hundreds in the faith community, police departments, and departments of health have been trained. People are most likely to turn to their peers for help, so there is an effort to train youth, so they have the tools to address concerns of violent extremism. It is similar to the way the topics of drugs and eating disorders are addressed with youth. Identifying individuals for intervention is based on receiving referrals from a lot of different community-based access points that might include community service or refugee resettlement organizations. Even though there is much discussion about the importance of engaging with religious leaders, not many referrals are received from them. They lack proper training to provide support thorough their pastoral care.

Some of the lessons learned include the importance of understanding the scope of the threat and building scalability for a multi-stakeholder model, which all relies on having subject matter expertise to build up institutional capacities of our civil societies. Public private partnerships are underused, and law enforcement needs to better understand who their partners are in the private sector. The challenge is for someone to make the first move to build relationships of trust. Law enforcement can consider how to incorporate CVE into community policing, homeland security, and emergency response. CVE also needs to be integrated into online safety programs. Intervention also needs to focus on how we are increasing public awareness; increasing referrals for social services by increasing easier referral protocols; and integrating existing tools into treating violent extremism so communities know where to turn for help.



**Dr. Kate Barrelle**




Despite much discussion about why people become extremists, there never seem to be two people who have the same motivation for why they join, decide to stay, or decide to act. It is very hard to predict. While predictive models are very important, they may not be the answer. When looking at why people leave violent extremism, we do know that most people who join, leave and most leave voluntarily without a formal intervention. Knowing this, it is worth figuring how to try and build a bridge for people to integrate back into society. The reasons for leaving include disillusionment with leadership or group members, burnout, excessive violence, and disillusionment with radical ideas. Most people are not in a group for longer than five years.

Disengagement from violent extremism is about engagement with something else, that affects social relations, ideas and beliefs, use of violence, coping, and identity. Meaningful social relations are needed with a range of people in mainstream society. Coping is about the ability to cope with personal issues and difficulties to be able to participate in society. Identity involves having a stable personal identity as well as a range of social identities. A person's actions must be oriented towards non-violent methods to achieve change. A person's ideology must experience a reduction in the belief for violent extremism. A social relationship with someone in a group is a large driver of getting in or out of a group. With these elements in mind, there can be a focus on keeping a door open to family; expanding peer networks through things like sports or volunteering; assisting in mending relationships; and providing mentoring or supportive guidance. Coping capabilities can be developed by helping an individual address anxiety, depression, trauma, and drug or alcohol abuse.



When leaving a group, people lose a sense of purpose, so they will need helping to work out their purpose. Being a member of a group is powerful. A person who joins a group after not having been a part of a group cuts their risk for death in half. Mapping out an individual's circle of support can help them understand their identity and their available resources. The stronger a person's identity with an extremist group, the harder it will be to establish them with a new group. Identity translates strongly to commitment, which is much like corporate branding. It can also help to show individuals other ways for making an impact besides using violence. There are hundreds of ways people solve things in the world using non-violent means, but they may just not know how to do them or that they are even options. Addressing all of these other issues, before addressing ideology will result in greater success. A person's mind does not need to be changed to change their behavior.





## The Role of the Media – Opinions and Different Perspectives

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- ▶ Michael Rowland, Presenter, ABC Breakfast News - Facilitator
- ▶ Helen Kapalos, Chairperson, Victorian Multicultural Commission
- ▶ Rita Panahi, Columnist, The Herald Sun
- ▶ Paul Maley, Author/Journalist, The Australian

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✔ Where deradicalization programs look at practical things kids need is where they work – addressing that their father is in jail or getting them on a sporting team.
- ✔ We should differentiate between moderate Muslims, terrorists, and extremists.
- ✔ Trust between police and journalists is like trust between any groups of people that have to be developed through time and exposure.

The media wades very carefully through all sorts of dangerous and alarming misinformation in fast-moving stories. The first obligation of journalists is to provide fresh facts, and the challenge is sifting through the facts amid the blizzard of rumors. There is enormous pressure on the media to get new information quickly and report it. Ideally, this fact finding is done through existing good relationships and the release of the information has been cleared to prevent any negative repercussions on the response to an incident or putting anyone at risk. This requires responsible cooperation between police and media. The Boston Marathon attacks put journalists under another level of pressure with private individuals acting as news makers – citizen journalists. It is important not to get caught up in the misinformation. Only when someone with credibility and profile grabs onto story, can people rely on it as more legitimate.


**Q:** When the media reports about an attacker or attack group, are they also giving them the coverage they desire?

**A:** The media has to report the facts. Daesh is normally methodical about where they claim responsibility. It is important to be honest with the public and not try to guess what information will be too sensitive. You can perpetuate their propaganda if you jump on every attack. You cannot really second-guess yourself as a reporter. How that information gets used you cannot worry about that. There are some things you should downplay. You should be careful about publishing Daesh content in the media. We try not to run those Daesh videos of them doing exercises in videos or executing people.

**Q:** Are there reservations about running those videos?

**A:** I understand the reservation about running those videos. It is important to not hide those. That information is on the Internet, so the audience stops trusting you if you do not report it and it is available. There is no easy answer. You cannot ignore when people are killed. The greatest concern is about the media miscommunicating the way communities are covered. A lot of feedback is received about that. It is important to reach out to all communities and have relationships with stakeholders in all communities. This might include helping youth engage with mainstream society, like through sports or being a member of another community organization.






**Q:** Where does Australia stand on the deradicalization process?

**A:** A lot of money has been spent which makes it seem like we are doing something. There is an enormous question of whether these efforts are delivering results. It is questionable whether they are delivering results and they have the right people involved. The deradicalization programs tend not to work. You have to try getting inside the head of the young traveler and get them back from the brink. For most of these kids, they try putting them in front of an Imam who is more mainstream. Where programs look at practical things these kids need is where they work – addressing that their father is in jail or getting them on a sporting team. Identity displacement has profound consequences.



**Q:** The use of language like lone actor versus lone wolf, where do you stand on the use of language as a powerful tool for fighting terrorism.?

**A:** These semantics do not make a difference. If you are willing to give up your life, I do not know if you are going to rethink it if you are called a lone actor versus a lone wolf. I do not think we talk enough about the motivating factors for youth. To fight that mindset, we need to talk about the psychology behind it. These discussions have not happened because there is this hypersensitivity around discussing Islam. There has been a lot of discussion around language. We should use terms that reflect the world as it is. You have to call it as it is – Islamic terrorism. Language is important, but it is reflected in the evolution of the way we write policy or how we discuss things. The greatest concern from communities are the running beliefs behind a story which forms a picture that appropriates those acts to an entire community. We should differentiate between moderate Muslims, terrorists, and extremists. The communities do feel they are being attacked and attacks against them are not being reported. The media has a responsibility to provide more comprehensive reporting. Commercial television has a very different way of reporting these stories. News editors do not take time to understand cultural nuances. We can have multiple views to give a more balanced perspective. The media does not always understand cultural context. An idea for improving cultural education, is to host forums on understanding Islam. It is important one particular community is not treated differently than any other one. Of course, terrorists are a tiny minority of the Islamic community, but extremist attitudes are more supportive of extremist ideologies. That is unsettling to have those attitudes in a Western community. That culture of appeasement can have devastating consequences.



**Q:** What more could police and counter terrorism officials do to improve relationships with journalists?


**A:** Trust between police and journalists is like trust between any groups of people that have to be developed through time and exposure. They know I make an effort to report responsibly. No front page story is worth a case being compromised. Police are very suspicious of the media, but if you have been in a situation where you have had to trust us you see that we are trustworthy.

**Q:** I am interested whether you rethink your safety when you report?

**A:** When a journalist is threatened, it tends to drive the journalist to work harder. A lot of the hate is going out of this issue. I was very well served by protection from police and my employer when I was receiving threats. It is a worry, but you cannot let it affect what you write. You just take precautions. Meanwhile, it is important to remember police officers are being threatened.

**Q:** Will the future attacks involve more lone actors?

**A:** Over the last year there has been the consensus Daesh will launch attacks in the West as they lose territory. Daesh is not doing anything now that it was not doing two years ago. It was always going to move into this phase. It was always going to move into Western cities. The idea that Daesh has an intelligence organization is false. Daesh is an amorphous organization that has no central planning. There will likely be large casualty attacks in the Middle East and Africa that are not widely covered, and the largest number of victims are usually Muslim. Patterns of migration and how we settle people and integrate will be a very big concern.



## Evening Keynote – New Ideas to Challenge Destructive Ideologies

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► Dr. Gill Hicks, M.A.D. Minds

Attacks can affect the soul of the city. As a survivor of the London terrorist bombings on July 7th, 2005, I stand as the outcome of the worst and best of humanity. It has given me a sense of purpose to bring together me, you, us, and them. As humans, we have the capacity to find a way through after tragedies. As a survivor – with gratitude and deep appreciation - I had to relearn how to think, balance, and talk all at the same time. I have learned the value and responsibility of just being alive.


After losing both of my legs, it hit me hard to know that I would never feel the Australian land under my feet and never leave another footprint. I now think about leaving more of a legacy than an impression as a measure of making a difference. When my briefcase was returned to me after being recovered at the bombing scene, it showed me a truth I was not ready to comprehend. In a breath, my life had changed forever. I knew I needed to dedicate my life to making sure others did not have to go through this. I tried to make sense of senseless, that the suicide bomber had labeled me an enemy and I never got a choice in that. He taught me never to presume anything about anyone you do not know.

It was an hour before rescue team could reach me and the rest of the victims. During that time, we held each other and called each other's names to know which people were still alive. We were humanity together. I was considered a priority one victim because of the severity of my injuries. I heard the responders call me "one unknown, estimated female." They did not just save my life, they risked their life for one unknown, estimated female. It did not matter to the responders if I was rich or poor, the color of my skin, or my religion. They still took care of me.

That incident was about broken expectations. I did not plan on losing my legs. I have come to expect the unexpected and now I look to how we can become nimble and agile enough to deal with the unexpected. I look for something I can control and know that all I can control is how I react and respond. Part of how I was going to respond was clear. I went to Leeds to where the bombers came from and met with the director of the Hamara Centre to talk about how we can work together to make sure this does not happen. One idea I settled on was walking from Leeds to London. It was an opportunity to walk and talk together through 22 different towns and get uniformed police officers and community involved together. We invited people to come do something challenging. An example of one good outcome was a Muslim man and a Caucasian woman making a connection after having never talked, even though they had been neighbors for years. They found their commonality and were able to start a conversation from there. The things we have in common are far greater than our differences.

We need to come up with new strategies and great ideas and we need to challenge destructive ideas. We need to build confidence in our communities because it is the greatest antidote to fear. We cannot be afraid of each other. Being a peace finder is a difficult thing, but peace can feel a bit silly, so we need to get past that. It would be great if there was no work for the security community to do. We may be fearful and on a heightened state of awareness, often thinking of run, hide, fight, but we need to realize we are all onboard this journey together. The person next to you is your lifeline. Imagine if that is how the public feels about each other every day, rather than feeling divisive. When I was on the subway, we could not run, hide, or tell.

We need to find a way to get society to help us to build society. One of the tools I use to start this conversation is to ask people to look at a number. I ask them to tell me if they see a 6 or a 9. Depending on the way you look at that number, it could be either. We need to think about how both answers might be right and how people might be right about their own perspectives. It is a place to start a conversation. The hand-holding connection I had with all of my other fellow victims while waiting for the responders made the difference to me. I was shielded by love.



# DAY THREE

## Northern Ireland Threat Environment – Facing New Challenges

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- Andy Hill, Detective Chief Inspector, Police Service of Northern Ireland


### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ The capacity to support individuals transitioning out of paramilitary groups needs to be increased, including helping them move away from violence if they want; providing rehabilitation support in prisons to help with return and reintegration into society once they are released; and continuing to monitor and assist them towards rehabilitation.
- ✓ Prevention efforts to counter violent extremism might include supporting women to take on more leadership roles in communities; initiating weapons decommissioning programs; generating a culture of lawfulness; working with schools to help youth understand warning signs; and increasing police opportunities for positive community engagements.
- ✓ Building confidence in the justice system is also important, including addressing inconsistencies in the justice process, like a youth receiving only community service hours for aiding in a bombing.
- ✓ It will also help to partner with the media to ensure balanced reporting.

Policing in the former conflict regions of Northern Ireland presents new challenges. Northern Ireland has a population of 1.8 million, which is two percent of the population of the United Kingdom. Domestic terrorism is currently the largest threat. The time known as The Troubles resulted in 3,668 killed as a result of terrorist actions from 1969 to 1998. Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed to bring an end to these attacks, it has been worth considering what happens to terrorists and communities in a post conflict society. There are still challenges felt today and there are some areas that remain deeply segregated where tensions regularly spill out to violence and disorder. There are now dissident terrorists, and some have moved into paramilitary activity.

The town of Lurgan is southwest of Belfast and has a population 35,000 and is an example of an area with continuing conflict. It is divided along ethnic, political, and sectarian lines between a Catholic and a lawless Protestant area. In August 2016, intelligence uncovered an attack plot that was in the advanced stages of planning. The expected target was the police, but it was unclear how to manage this threat. There was concern for compromising the intelligence source which could have led to their death. It was decided to share the plot with community police, so they could be aware of the threat and adapt by considering using armored vehicles and triaging calls for service to reduce the threat of being lured into a trap. The investigations into the plot resulted in the discovery of an explosively formed projectile (EFP), and four young males being arrested during a series of searches, none of whom had been alive during The Troubles. The EFP devices are seen in the Middle East to destroy tanks.

Another example involved a drug feud between two warring factions. A couple of killings took place, with one man being shot as he put his three-year-old in the car. The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), a loyalist paramilitary group formed in 1971, claimed responsibility. They are a group looking to carry attacks against law enforcement. They identify traffic patterns and



practices of police to identify ways to use that information against the police and plan an attack. One attack involved placing a hoax device and then when police respond, the real device is detonated with a remote control.



**Detective Chief Inspector Andy Hill**

There were six national security attacks in a one-year period between the summers of 2016 and 2017 involving pipe bombs, shootings, IEDs on vehicles, and the targeting officers. Lower level attacks are used to continue to terrorize communities and then the high-casualty attacks are used on anniversaries of other large attacks. These attacks create fear in communities and they impact public confidence. There is an independent body in Northern Ireland to investigate how communities are affected. A public poll asked communities to identify who they thought was best to keep communities safe, with 32 percent responding paramilitaries would be best by using their punishment attacks (i.e., delivering a “six-pack” of two shots to each the elbows, knees, ankles), murals carrying messages of fear, and posters undermining the role of the state. Of the responses, 45 percent indicated they had no confidence in the police. A full range of operational activity is being used to chart a path

forward. Community policing has been a focus of much activity, and more best practice knowledge needs to be harnessed.


The pathway to violence for these people starts in these paramilitary groups doing minor tasks and then they are moved into full operational activity when their skills are identified. The average age of new recruits is 20-25 years old, with the former terrorists being older, but they bring their own set of existing skills. The peace process has had limited effect on preventing the next generation of terrorists, with all groups from the Troubles still in existence. They continue to act and try to control the community.

The independent panel looking at the effect of these groups on communities resulted in an Action Plan and Fresh Start program to promote a culture of lawfulness and provide support to those who want to move away from paramilitary groups with the goal that all communities should feel safe. Long-term prevention will require addressing factors that can be exploited to exert paramilitary control, including improving education and employment prospects; reducing segregation in housing and education, which will include taking steps to remove factors that make communities feel they need to be segregated and may require a generational change. The legacy of the Troubles and continuing effects need to be addressed, including unsolved murders and distrust within communities and with police. The capacity to support individuals transitioning out of paramilitary groups needs to be increased, including helping them move away from violence if they want; providing rehabilitation support in prisons to help with return and reintegration into society once they are released; and continuing to monitor and assist them towards rehabilitation. Prevention efforts to counter violent extremism might include supporting women to take on more leadership roles in communities; initiating weapons decommissioning programs; generating a culture of lawfulness; working with schools to help youth understand warning signs; and increasing police opportunities for positive community engagements. Building confidence in the justice system is also important, including addressing inconsistencies in the justice process, like a youth receiving only community service hours for aiding in a bombing. It will also help to partner with the media to ensure balanced reporting. These relationships need to be developed early so you know people in advance of needing their help.



**Phil Shepherd and Detective Chief Inspector Andy Hill**

More traditional policing activities are also being used. A Paramilitary Crime Task Force has been established to allow rapid sharing of intelligence and a combination of powers to deprive criminals of their capabilities. A Joint Agency Task Force has also been organized as a cross jurisdictional task force and the Department of Justice is reviewing legislation to address any shortfalls. Future issues will likely include the ramifications of Brexit, including the border crossing opportunities from Ireland that might be created for organized crime and terrorism; and a devolved administration with the collapse of the executive government with no local politicians.



## Australia – When Police are Victims of Terrorism – A Victorian Perspective

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► John O'Connor, Detective Superintendent, Victoria Police

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ Law enforcement needs to continue to step more into the Prevention role, which needs to include being able to address mental health issues.

The Joint Counter Terrorism Team works together in the counter terrorism command to do everything possible to stop attacks. While multiple attacks have been stopped, eventually one will get through. In 2017, Daesh expressed that killing police and informants is more important than killing politicians. Recent incidents in Australia have exemplified this. On September 23, 2014, there was a shooting at a police station, with the shooter being shot dead. Operation Goodrich started two weeks before that to try to identify when people start going on a trajectory towards executing an attack and to determine what can influence them to move in this direction.


Another incident took place shortly after Australia announced they would support military activity against Daesh, with an individual being the subject of a terrorism investigation and being told he could not travel. Police decided to make contact with the individual when he was found waving an DAESH flag in public and tracking the movement of the Australian Prime Minister. Daesh had published a Fatwa to kill the disbelievers, including a message to target Australians. A group of four young individuals who were suspected to be involved in terrorist activities gathered at the home of the primary individual, prompting police to engaged with them there. The primary individual under investigation was found to not be there, but police talked to his parents and left a card with them. The individual ended up calling the police officer who had left the card and plans were made to meet outside the police station. At the meeting, the individual stabbed both of the officers, but one was able to shoot him dead.

Another incident took place around Anzac Day, which is a time of heightened concern in Australia. Two individuals were targeted in sweeps as a part of proactive police activities. Both individuals, Besim and Korsavich, had a reasonably normal childhood but had started to drift away from mainstream society. It was discovered they had been communicating on a secure app about running over, killing, and beheading cops. One of the people they were talking with through the app turned out to be a child, but they were also talking to Neil Prakash, a known online radicalizer from Australia from whom they were gaining inspiration. Both Besim and Korsavich were arrested, but there was not enough evidence against Korsavich. Three hours before the pair were arrested, Besim posted a martyrdom note. Besim plead guilty and was given 14 years sentence.

A juvenile was the focus of another incident. He was born in Australia to Syrian parents and dropped out of school and withdrew from society and began communicating with a Daesh recruiter. In April 2015, he started talking about targeting police stations and the Daesh recruiter provided him a bomb-making manual from an Inspire article “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” that includes instructions using a pressure cooker. On May 6, 2015, he went out to buy a pressure cooker, Christmas tree lights, and items from hardware store. On May 8, 2015, police executed warrants on his residence. He plead guilty to terrorism charges and admitted to planning to attack police stations. His case was raised out of juvenile court because of its severity and he was sentenced to 11 years.

An attack plot during the 2016 Christmas season would have had devastating consequences. Four people, some born in Australia and some in Egypt, identified themselves as Muslims and not Australians and began looking up how to conduct a knife attack and create TATP by looking at Daesh videos. On December 20, a group communication was discovered indicating “this is more important than anything else and we are running out of time” which was a sign that authorities needed to take action quickly. The group was doing a significant amount of reconnaissance in the central business district of Melbourne, which is





where they were arrested. Their intention was to kill police and as many people as possible, with it ending in a siege and shootout.


An attack was carried out in the well-to-do Brighton area of Melbourne by a Somalia-born man who had moved to Kenya before moving to Australia. He had a series of previous run-ins with the law, including a 2010 acquittal for supporting terrorism after he had traveled to Somalia with Al Shabab before they were designated as a terrorist group by Australia. He was later arrested for burglary and released on parole with a tracking device. The incident took place in an apartment in Brighton, where he had visited the day before he engaged a prostitute in his room, whom he took as a hostage. The woman was instructed to call police to state the man had a bomb. By this time, he had already killed the clerk at the front counter of the complex. At this point, it was unknown this was a terrorist incident until he attacker called a news station to profess his actions were for Daesh and Al Qaeda. When the police responded, a shootout ensued which resulted in the man being shot dead by a special operations group and three officers being shot. The attacker followed the Daesh “Just Terror Tactics” script almost word for word.

A very recent incident involved a man born in Melbourne to Somali parents, who was intending to attack Federation Square around Christmas 2017. He was arrested on November 27, 2017 for his plan to target police, run them over, get their firearm, and kill as many as possible.

All of these plots targeted front line police, with the goal that the attacker would achieve martyrdom. They planned to use vehicles, firearms, or IEDs. Australia is seeing more of these individuals and they are getting younger and younger. Law enforcement needs to continue to step more into the Prevention role, which is why the department is about to start up a Fixated Threat Assessment Team with capabilities to address mental health issues.



**Detective Superintendent  
John O'Connor**



## NYPD Shield

- ▶ Vince Amadeo, Lieutenant, New York City Police Department
- ▶ Matt Di Pietro, Detective, New York City Police Department

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ A Shield program can work for any city or region to help the private sector and law enforcement to develop better relationships to protect communities.
- ✓ The benefits of other law enforcement agencies starting their own program include gaining access to timely information from other Shield programs.
- ✓ While there are other avenues for sharing sensitive information, the Shield program is trying to fill a gap in information sharing with the private sector.
- ✓ Members of the National Shield Network are able to take the NYPD Shield template and apply it to building a program in their own city or region, with the hopes of ultimately building a global network.
- ✓ The website address is [www.nypdshield.org](http://www.nypdshield.org)


The New York Police Department (NYPD) Shield program is a private-public partnership that helps increase the ability to prevent attacks by using the public's eyes and ears. The National Shield Network will hopefully become the global shield network. A Shield program can work for any city or region to help the private sector and law enforcement to develop better relationships to protect communities. The NYPD Shield Program was formed in response to one of the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. The target membership are private security professionals partnered with law enforcement and intelligence. Currently, there are nearly 19,000 members worldwide, in all 50 states in the United States, 49 countries, and 7,000 plus organizations. These members are all focused on countering terrorism through information sharing.



Lieutenant Vince Amadeo

A core component of the NYPD Shield program is training. The program's instructors often deliver three classes every day - all free to the training recipients. While the NYPD program uses all sworn law enforcement as trainers, that does not have to be the case. The trainers go to private organizations to deliver the different training offerings. Recipients of the training often include hotels, utility companies, and cable companies, which are those who are invited into homes or hotel rooms regularly. The training shows them what to look for, so they can be the eyes and ears for helping to protect their community. They become a force multiplier. They might be the one to see that pre-attack surveillance.

The basic terrorism awareness course exposes them to the "See Something, Say Something" concept and the types of things they might find suspicious, including showing them what explosive devices look and smell like. Beyond the general awareness training, the most frequently requested course is about an active shooter scenario. The training discusses how everyone has one of the same three responses to an active shooter – fight, flight, or freeze – to mentally prepare them for that. A vehicle-borne IED training is also offered which teaches rapid interview techniques for those with parking facilities. There is also a training on suspicious mail and packages for organizations with mail rooms.



Some of the other offerings of the NYPD Shield include sending mass alert emails, intelligence assessments, and informational bulletins to the membership to provide detailed information to keep people informed. All efforts are made to streamline information so to not overwhelm the recipients. One way to do this is having sector-specific emails, like helping banks to have situational awareness when there is a bank robbery. The information is also available on the NYPD Shield website which has training details, handouts, and a bi-weekly six-minute analyst report out audio recording. The program also provides guidance on conducting twice-yearly building evacuation drills in a way that keeps people from panicking. While all of the NYPD Shield information is specific to New York City, the implications can be transferable to other areas.

The program also hosts conferences about four times a year and invites the public to police headquarters. About 600 attendees come to listen to high-profile speakers. Table top exercises and live drills can also be supported, which helps to identify what works and what does not and then distribute that information back to the membership. The program also attends the monthly meetings of building associations, managers associations, and other groups that could benefit from the information.




**Detective Matt Di Pietro**

Members of the National Shield Network are able to take the NYPD Shield template and apply it to building a program in their own city or region, with the hopes of ultimately building a global network. The NYPD Shield program is looking to help other law enforcement agencies formalize the way they partner with private agencies. Assistance can include holding teleconferences to help agencies as they start their own program, sending an officer to NYPD for a train-the-trainer program, and accessing the existing course curriculum and instructor notes. The NYPD Shield has 10 staff supporting the program, but a program can be started with just one civilian analyst and the initial focus can just be on basic information sharing with the private sector.



In the United States alone, there are about 800,000 members of law enforcement organizations and 2 million in the private security profession, which just demonstrates the potential value of a national network. The benefits of other law enforcement agencies starting their own program include gaining access to timely information from other Shield programs. While there are other avenues for sharing sensitive information, the Shield program is trying to fill a gap in information sharing with the private sector. The website address is [www.nypdshield.org](http://www.nypdshield.org)



## Terrorism: What Can We Expect in the Future

- ▶ Michael Downing, Chief Security Officer, Oak View Group
- ▶ Raffaello Pantucci, Director, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

### Key Operational and Strategic Takeaways

- ✓ It is important to consider how your actions might exacerbate issues you are trying to address.
- ✓ We can try to push out intelligence to a wider community of people, so more people have the awareness to act like trip wires in communities.
- ✓ You want to get mental health workers, teachers, and others involved.
- ✓ If terrorist groups are focused on individuals with mental health issues, then it is important to target those key individuals to manage the threat and possibly just keep it at a sustained level.


China's relations with their Western neighbors and possible technology advances could become a risk to law enforcement and public safety. This is all with the backdrop that the threat had previously been from hierarchical organizations but is now much more scattered. People can participate in a cause without being connected to any particular group and ideologies can spread in a much more scattered way. While we worry about violent Islamism, countries like Ireland have experiences from homegrown terror. Individuals also have increasing access to technology, making it much easier for an individual to make a bomb themselves. It might just take a fixated person or a small group to carry out an incident with devastating consequences, which is quite worrying.



L – R: Raffaello Pantucci And Michael Downing

**Q:** Whenever we defeat an adversary's tactic, they come up with a new strategy. What is next?

**A:** The key point to remember is that the lone actor scenario has been happening for some time. The United Kingdom has early examples of lone actors with mental health problems that latch onto issues even before Daesh was around. Daesh saw this was working and they started to try to manipulate this model to move beyond the networked plots that were previously seen. It was hard to determine a terrorist act between just a crazy act. These are very difficult to detect, and we have seen the technical capability of individuals advance. Al Qaeda called for many isolated cells to rise up, but they never were able to materialize this movement. Daesh has been more successful, but their message has started to be confused.



**Q:** It seems like recruitment is moving away from religious adherence. Will individuals be more difficult to detect, because there is no formal association with religion and ideology?

**A:** Logically, yes. But then on the flip side, are they really terrorists if they have no grip on the ideology. Is it more about mental health, how we react, and how we separate it in our public discourse. Maybe we are magnifying this in the coverage and then maybe it is more about how we manage it in a response perspective.

**Q:** Over the past several years we have seen this convergence of crimes, gangs, and terrorists. Are we seeing a convergence of some of these groups with jihadists?

**A:** I think you have already seen this. A criminal who is motivated by money will probably want to stay away from terrorists, but if they are able to profit from it they will. They are both anti-establishment, but we are seeing anonymous actors attack.



**Q:** With Saudi Arabia and some of their policy shifts, can you give insight into how you feel about that? How will that impact the Ummah and the Wahabi Salafi?


**A:** I am very interested to understand this. Clearly the Saudi Wahabi have spurred a lot of this conservative fundamentalism. Al Qaeda sees the regime as corrupt. It makes the enemy they already did not like even worse. In a longer-term trajectory, it is unknown if the liberalism will reduce some of the threat if their conservative views have increased some of the threat. With a power like Saudi Arabia becoming more liberal there could have some positives. The jihadi narratives have a great ability to pivot. The Serbian fights really gave a basis for the early narrative that Muslims of all colors were involved, and the West was not doing anything about it. When the West did intervene, the message did change that the West was only just showing up.

**Q:** What do you make of Putin's victory tour through the Middle East?

**A:** He has already been there for similar announcements. There is a certain level of clarity in Russia's response. There was a very clear decision and clear action. Maybe there is some lesson in this to be more certain in our actions.

**Q:** A couple years ago we had an Islamic scholar that presented to LinCT at the height of Daesh. We asked him what his nightmare scenario was. He said that if this continued to expand and 300 million Wahabi Salafis were to pledge allegiance that could be an existential threat to Islam. There are a number of things we have not seen coming our way, including the Arab Spring and the recognition of Jerusalem. Are these fueling the next surprise?

**A:** One of the negative sides of the Arab Spring is there are now places where fighting has grown. You can see some terrorist organizations filter into that fighting. Palestine had slipped down in the messaging, but we can expect this will increase again with the Jerusalem announcement.



**Q:** Law enforcement is looking at further decentralizing our offense through things like the NYPD Shield partnership program. What advice would you give to municipalities to better prepare ourselves?

**A:** I think these micro ideologies are going to surprise us. Radical environmentalists believe the planet is over populated and you could see them trying to get some kind of bio weapon to use in an attack. It is important to consider how your actions might exacerbate issues you are trying to address. We can try to push out intelligence to a wider community of people, so more people have the awareness to act like trip wires in communities. The dark side of that is that moves toward a police state. In China, the levels of control are larger, but it is not clear they are helping the situation. They may be pushing down the threat to only have it erupt one day. You want to get mental health workers, teachers, and others involved, but they have full time jobs as well. They all want to make their society safe, but you want to manage expectations of getting more people alert to potential problems.

**Q:** You have a lot of expertise on China. Will China consider any other shift that could shift the threat?

**A:** As China increases their efforts against terrorism, the West is trying to work with them. You see China increasingly becoming a target and not knowing how they will respond. This gets to how we prevent people from ever getting on that path in the first place. China sees that if they just control everything it works as well. It is not really dealing with the problem and just pushing it down the road. China seems to be fine with that approach. In the West, we also have to balance our efforts in our liberal society.


**Q:** A speaker from Victoria talked about how radicalism can go away. It made me think about some of the radical groups and gangs from the 1960s and 1970s that are no longer a threat. Is there something we can do to help them go away?

**A:** Deradicalization programs are difficult since they are trying to change someone's views. It is not known if it is really possible to get people to reject those views. Disengagement is probably more effective. Efforts can look towards steering them away from those ideologies and it can be seen as a way of safeguarding an individual. Some of the old groups are still around, but probably those ideologies were eclipsed by others. If we look forward, then maybe another ideology will rise to replace Islamic extremism. It is hard to predict that. Maybe environmental or anti-technology ideologies will be next. We just have to be careful to not feed these narratives, like with the Jerusalem announcement. If terrorist groups are focused on these individuals with mental health issues, then it is important to target those key individuals to manage the threat and possibly just keep it at a sustained level.

**Q:** In the United States and Europe, there is a rise of neo-Nazi and fascists groups. They are different but seem to feed off each other. Do we need to widen the lens to address these other groups? Are there lessons we have learned to apply to these groups?

**A:** These two extremes need each other to survive. That societal tension is the real long-term damage you can see being done to our societies that are able to tear us apart. There is a lot of prevent work focused on the far right. There is a very high number of people with far-right ideologies. The Chanel program in the United Kingdom is already dealing with far-right terrorists in addition to Islamic terrorists. The danger with the far right is they are treated as a fringe phenomenon. We underestimate their ability to organize.





# SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES



**Neil Basu**  
**Deputy Assistant Commissioner**  
**Senior National CT Coordinator**  
**Counter Terrorism Command SO15, Metropolitan Police**

Neil joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 1992 and has worked as a detective in all ranks within Anti-corruption & Homicide, and as a Detective Superintendent within Serious & Organised Crime. In 2012 he became the Area Commander for South East London, followed by London's head of Armed Policing.

In 2015 Neil was promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner and posted to Specialist Operations, Protection and Security. This includes Royalty and Specialist Protection, Parliamentary & Diplomatic Protection, Aviation Policing & Protective Security Operations.

In 2016, Neil took up his current role as Senior National Co-ordinator for CT Policing, responsible for delivering the police response to the Pursue and Prevent elements of the Government's CONTEST strategy. In this role he co-ordinates the policing response to threats arising from terrorism and domestic extremism nationally, and also manages the Metropolitan Police Service's Counter Terrorism Command (SO15).




**Elizabeth Brooks-Lim**  
**Chief Medical Examiner**  
**Alberta, Canada**

Dr Elizabeth Brooks-Lim is the Chief Medical Examiner of the province of Alberta, Canada. Appointed by Order in Council in January 2017 her previous roles within the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) were as Acting Chief, Deputy Chief and Assistant Chief over the past 6 years.

Prior to this she was a Coroner and Forensic Pathologist in the province of Saskatchewan in Canada, a Home Office Pathologist in the UK and a forensic pathologist at the Centre for Forensic & Legal Medicine in Dundee, Scotland. She has worked in the field of forensic medicine and pathology since 2005 and graduated with a Bachelor of Medicine & Surgery from the University of Bristol, UK in 2000. She has performed over 3500 autopsies and has been qualified as an expert witness on numerous occasions in Courts in the UK and Canada. She is a Clinical Assistant Professor at the University of Calgary and the University of Alberta.

Dr. Brooks-Lim also holds a graduate certificate in International Security from Stanford University, a post graduate certificate in Executive Strategy & Innovation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and certificates in financial management and marketing strategy from Cornell University. She is CBRNe trained and has a strong interest in mass fatality preparedness and security.



**CLAUDE CASTONGUAY**  
**CHIEF SUPERINTENDANT /**  
**CRIMINAL OPERATIONS OFFICER**

Originally from the Quebec North Shore, Chief Superintendent Claude Castonguay began his career with the RCMP at Coquitlam Detachment in the Vancouver area. He worked there as a patrol officer/investigator until he was transferred to Quebec for the first time in 1997. He was posted as an investigator to Rimouski Detachment, and later to the Montréal Customs and Excise Section and Undercover Operations Section.

In 2005, he returned to British Columbia, this time to Surrey Detachment, where he was promoted to a non-commissioned officer position with the Major Crime Unit. He was commissioned to the rank of Inspector in 2010, as the Officer in Charge of Homicide Section. He was involved in several major, high profile investigations, including the Surrey Six and the Pickton cases.

In 2014, he became a member of the Divisional Executive Committee of the RCMP in Quebec after being promoted to the rank of Superintendent with the Criminal Intelligence Section. In 2015, he was put in charge of the Specialized Operational Techniques Program, and in October 2016 he was appointed to the position of Criminal Operations Officer with the Quebec RCMP, the position he currently holds.

Academically, Claude Castonguay has a university background in management, civil and criminal law, and criminology. Chief Superintendent Castonguay is a consummate sportsman. As a former member of Canada's national swim team, he has represented Canada in numerous international competitions.

Chief Superintendent Castonguay is an Officer of the Order of Merit of the Police Forces.




**Mike Clement**  
**Deputy Commissioner**  
**National Operations New Zealand Police**

Mike Clement was appointed Deputy Commissioner: National Operations in October 2014. He has oversight of Prevention, Response and Operations, Investigations, National Security (counter terrorism), International Services, including offshore deployments and the liaison network, and Road Policing. Mike also has oversight of special operations – major sporting events and VIP visits.

Mike joined New Zealand Police in 1978 as a cadet, spending the first 26 years of his service in Canterbury District located in the South Island of New Zealand. 20 years of his service has been in the Criminal Investigation Branch with a strong domestic organized crime focus.

Mike's investigative career included the start-up of the Crime Monitoring Centre in 2005, a new centralised interception facility for New Zealand Police moving from an analogue to digital platform providing centralised interception for the country as a whole. He has deployed to other jurisdictions for a range of purposes, including a homicide investigation in the Solomons with a serving Police Officer as the offender; supporting local Police in Jamaica in relation to election fraud; and Vanuatu to scope capacity building opportunities.

Before taking up his role as Deputy Commissioner he was firstly an Area Commander and then a District Commander in Auckland City District.



**Michael Downing**  
**Chief Security Officer**  
**Oak View Group**

Michael P. Downing brings 35 years of experience to Prevent Advisors. Most recently he served as the Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department and Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau where he led five operational divisions: Major Crimes, Emergency Services Divisions, Metropolitan Division, Air Support Division, and Emergency Operations Division. These divisions include the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section, Criminal Investigative Section, Organized Crime, Surveillance Section, Hazardous Devices Section, LAX Bomb K-9 Section, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Mounted Unit, Dive Teams, Emergency Preparedness and Response. He has worked with the New Scotland Yard's Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command SO 15. Deputy Chief Downing has testified before Congressional sub-committees relative to intelligence, homeland security, information sharing, and prison radicalization. In April 2010, Chief Downing served as a member of the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council working group on developing a national strategy for countering violent extremism.

In October 2009, Deputy Chief Downing was appointed as the Interim Police Chief for the Los Angeles Police Department. Deputy Chief Downing is an active member of the Leadership in Counter-Terrorism (LinCT) Alumni Association, working with alumni from the FBI's LinCT Program to develop a global enterprise of networked counter-terrorism practitioners from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Deputy Chief Downing has also worked with the Department of Justice and State Department, traveling throughout South America, Africa, Turkey, Poland, India, and Kenya to transition large national police organizations into democratic civilian policing models and overlay counter-terrorism enterprises on top of cities. His work in counter-terrorism has taken him to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Germany, Kenya, India, and France; all to examine smart practices and build a network of practitioners.


Deputy Chief Downing attended the University of Southern California where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration in 1982 and completed POST Command College in 1997, the FBI's Leadership in Counter-Terrorism (LinCT) in 2008, the Post Naval Graduate Executive Program in 2009, and the Senior Management Institute for Police at Boston (SMIP PERF) in 2012. He is currently a Board Member at the George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security Institute.



**Frank Farnham**  
**Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist**  
**North London Forensic Service**

Dr Farnham's qualifications are Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Medicine and Surgery. He is an elected Fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. He is approved under Section 12(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983/2007 as having special experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorder.

Dr Farnham is a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist with the North London Forensic Service, Clinical Lead at the National Stalking Clinic and Clinical Lead to the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC). He is a consulting psychiatrist to the SO15 Prevent Liaison and Diversion Hub (PLAD). He is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in Security and Crime Science in the department of Security and Crime Science at University College London. Dr Farnham is a founder member of the Fixated Research Group. He has published extensive research in the areas of stalking and fixated threat.



**Dr Mehreen Farooq**  
**Vice President**  
**World Organization for Resource Development and Education**

Mehreen Farooq, Vice President & Senior Fellow at the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE)

Ms. Farooq leads policy analysis, research, and programming to enhance the capacity of civil society organizations to promote peace and counter violent extremism. She has led field-based research across South and Central Asia to identify drivers of conflict and opportunities for building strong, resilient communities. Applying international best practices, she has helped establish the first evidence-based community-led program in the United States to build resilience against radicalization. Currently Ms. Farooq is advising and training non-governmental organizations and public agencies on developing holistic, multi-disciplinary violence prevention strategies that can be tailored to address terrorism. Ms. Farooq received her MA in International Affairs from American University, focusing on the socio-political development of the broader Middle East.




**Mary Fetchet**  
**Founding Director**  
**VOICES of September 11<sup>th</sup>**

Mary Fetchet co-founded Voices of September 11th in 2001 following the death of her 24 year old son Brad at the World Trade Center. Ms. Fetchet's 20 years of experience as a clinical social worker has influenced VOICES' innovative approach to creating a new paradigm in providing long-term support services. Using social work practices, she guided the development of programs that provide continuity of care and promote resiliency in the lives of victims' families, responders and survivors. Under her leadership, VOICES launched the 9/11 Living Memorial Project, an extensive digital archive of over 70,000 photographs and personal mementos documenting the nearly 3,000 lives lost. The collection is located on VOICES website and is a key component of the In Memoriam exhibit at the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in New York City.

Ms. Fetchet is also helping communities heal after other traumatic events through VOICES Center of Excellence for Community Resilience, launched in 2014. The VOICES Center of Excellence is establishing public-private partnerships, educational initiatives, training and research projects to document best practices and help communities effectively plan for the long-term needs of those impacted.

A strong advocate for victims' families and survivors and public policy reforms to make the country safer, Ms. Fetchet testified before the 9/11 Commission and US Congress on five occasions. Her work has received national recognition, including the 'Connecticut Hero' award by Senator Joseph Lieberman, ABC News Person of the Year, and NBC News Making a Difference. Ms. Fetchet was also inducted into the Hall of Fame at Columbia University School of Social Work.



**Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel PhD**  
**International Security Director**  
**Asia-Pacific Foundation**

Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel is the International Security Director for the London-based Asia-Pacific Foundation, a policy assessment think-tank monitoring emerging geopolitical threats. Sajjan acts in a consultancy role for law enforcement agencies, foreign ministry and defence departments, multilateral organizations, universities, NGOs and the international media.

Sajjan's current research includes looking at the ideology and doctrine that feeds international terrorism, the varying tactics and strategies of trans-national political violence, border security challenges, and the role new media plays for strategic communications. Sajjan's research is case-study driven and he has fieldwork experience in 23 countries.

Sajjan also serves as Senior Advisor to the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), a collaborative research project investigating current trans-national security threats and comprises of members from over 30 countries and multilateral organizations.

Sajjan received his BA (Hons) in Politics from Queen Mary, University of London. Sajjan also holds both a Master's degree in Comparative Politics and a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE). Sajjan is also part of the LSE Alumni Association Executive Committee.



**Ross Guenther APM**  
**Assistant Commissioner**  
**Victoria Police**

Ross joined Victoria Police in 1985. An accomplished police officer, his professional experience encompasses the leadership and management of teams across investigative, general policing, specialist operations and business environments.


He holds a Masters Degree in Criminology along with professional qualifications in project, business, training and strategic management streams. He has a deep commitment to learning and innovation and has facilitated education programs for various tertiary institutions in recent years.

As a Commissioned Officer, Ross has managed and led successful change management programs across Victoria Police's Centre for Investigator Training, Airlie Leadership Development Centre, Security Services Division and Southern Metropolitan Region.

In 2015 he was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner and is charged with leading the Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Command. As the Victoria Police Senior Advisor to the ANZCTC, Ross has a deep understanding of Counter Terrorism, including the spectrum of police and agency responses required to address complex challenges within that environment.

In June 2016, Ross was honoured to receive the Australian Police Medal (APM) as part of the Queen's Birthday Honours Awards. In 2017, Ross was appointed to the board of the LinCT AA.





**Sara Hinchey**  
**Victorian State Coroner**  
**Coroners Court of Victoria**

County Court Judge Sara Hinchey is the Victorian State Coroner. Her Honour has appeared before the Coroners Court in some of the State's most high-profile inquests. Her inquisitorial experience also extends to appearances before Royal Commissions including the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission.

Judge Hinchey was appointed as a Judge of the County Court in May 2015, following more than 19 years' experience as a trial and appellate barrister.

Her practise as a barrister was wide ranging, and in addition to inquisitorial work, included commercial work, trade practices, criminal cases, occupational health and safety and corporate crime, construction law, medical and other professional negligence and professional disciplinary matters. During this time, she appeared in the higher courts of Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania and the ACT, as well as the Federal Court and the High Court of Australia.



**Jennifer Hurst**  
**Acting Assistant Commissioner**  
**Australian Federal Police**

Commander Jennifer Hurst commenced her career with the Australian Federal Police in 1985. During 2001, Jennifer was promoted to Detective Superintendent and was responsible for leading the AFP's Avian Drug Strike Teams and, in 2003, established and implemented the AFP's Sydney Joint Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTT).


In August 2005, Jennifer was selected for secondment to INTERPOL in Lyon as the Assistant Director for Public Safety and Terrorism. During 2009, Jennifer returned to Australia and was promoted to the rank of Commander and performed the role of Chief of Staff to the AFP Commissioner until January 2011.

In 2011, she commenced as the Commander for People Smuggling Operations within the AFP's Crime Program and, in 2012, Jennifer assumed the role of Commander for the AFP's Crime Operations (response) with responsibility for approximately 300 personnel operating in all of the AFP's regional offices. In August 2015, Jennifer was appointed as Commander for counter terrorism operations where she has jurisdictional responsibility for Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and West Australia. In 2016, Jennifer was a participant on the LinCT program and graduated in 2017.

Commander Hurst was awarded the Australia Police Medal (APM) in 2005 for her investigational leadership in the areas of Counter Terrorism and Narcotics.

Jennifer has a Graduate Certificate in Applied Management and a Graduate Diploma in Public Safety Management. She has completed a Senior Executive Program in National and International Security at the Harvard Kennedy School and was a participant on the inaugural Australia New Zealand Police Leadership Stream conducted at the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM).





**James Malizia**  
**Assistant Commissioner Federal Policing NSP**  
**Royal Canadian Mounted Police**

Assistant Commissioner James Malizia is responsible for the oversight of national security, counter-terrorism, security for major events, the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program and protective policing which includes the safety of Canadian and visiting dignitaries as well as the Prime Minister and Governor General of Canada.

Throughout his career, Assistant Commissioner Malizia has worked as an undercover officer and investigator which enabled him to successfully lead and direct national and international terrorism, organized crime, corruption and money laundering investigations. He has also been responsible for the security of visiting world leaders and VIP's during major events.

Assistant Commissioner Malizia is a graduate of the Leadership in Counter-Terrorism Program and is a member of the Board of Governors. He holds a Master of Leadership and Management in Policing with distinction from Charles Sturt University. In 2006, he completed the Canadian Police College's Executive Development in Policing Program and subsequently participated as a Senior Fellow.

Assistant Commissioner Malizia is Chair of the International Association of Personal Protection Services. He co-chairs the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Counter-Terrorism and National Security committee. He is also a member of the Board of Directors for the Youth Services Bureau of Ottawa and has appeared before a number of parliamentary committees.

In recognition of his many contributions to the policing profession and service to the community, Assistant Commissioner Malizia is the recipient of several awards, including Officer of the Order of Merit of the Police Forces, as well as the Queen's Golden and Diamond Jubilee medals.




**John Parkinson**  
**Chairman**  
**Centre of Excellence for Research into Terrorism, Resilience, Intel-ligence & Organised Crime (CENTRIC)**

John Parkinson is a former UK Chief Constable with experience of leading investigations into major and serious crime and counter terrorism including the 7/7 London Bombings enquiry in Leeds. He was head of the NE Counter Terrorism Unit and as UK Senior National Coordinator Counter Terrorism oversaw many national and international counter terrorism operations.

He was awarded the OBE for his services to Policing and Counter Terrorism in 2011 and holds a Masters Degree from Cambridge University where he is a visiting scholar. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, a Companion of the Institute of Management Specialists, a past President of the International Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association (LinCT) and has edited and contributed to a number of publications on terrorism.

He is a visiting Professor at Huddersfield University and the Chair of the Secure Societies Institute. He is also a visiting Senior Research Fellow at Sheffield Hallam University and the Chairman of CENTRIC (Centre of Excellence for research into Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence & Organised Crime).




**Peter Sparks**  
**Detective Chief Inspector**  
**SO15 Metropolitan Police**

Detective Chief Inspector Pete Sparks has 28 years policing experience and has worked in Counter Terrorism and as a Homicide detective for 19 years. He is National Coordinator for families/victims in terrorism investigations in the UK and UK citizens killed overseas. He was in this role for the 7th July London bombings, the attacks in Mumbai, the Al Qaida IM attacks at In Amenas in Algeria, the Al-Shabab attacks on the Westgate Centre in Nairobi and the beach attack in Sousse, Tunisia. He led the first joint Police/Military family liaison deployment following the murder of Lee Rigby, a British Soldier killed in London.

He is strategic lead for CT Family Liaison for police forces in the UK and has recently directed victim's response operations for UK victims in CT attacks in Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Barcelona and all victims in the bridge attacks in London.

Following lessons learnt from the Algeria BP/Statoil attack DCI Sparks has instigated far improved working practices between UK Government and Police, when British citizens are kidnapped/murdered abroad. This has involved training government staff in family handling during overseas crisis and he has extended this to UK companies including BP, who have staff employed in hostile countries across the world. Following the attacks in Sousse he was integral in a cross-government unit set up to support the families and survivors. Moreover to assist all UK Government Departments and partner agencies as to how they should be prepared to respond to future such incidents. He has introduced standard operating procedures in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police Homicide department that have been adopted across the UK. This will ensure that the Family Liaison and DVI response to any future mass casualty incidents are coordinated and focused on the needs of the victims.

He has assisted the Civil Agency of Sweden, Swedish National Police and the Police in Norway in introducing family and victim support systems and provided advice to the Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime. He has delivered the CT Family Liaison (including support to families of radicalised persons) program for the Australian Federal Police, who have adopted the process and now deliver this to Law Enforcement agencies in Australia. He has been trained by the UK Military to enable him to operate in hostile environments internationally and is a trained Hostage, Crisis & CT Negotiator.



# CORPORATE PARTNER STATEMENTS

## We Are Axon



Your mission every day is to protect life. So is ours. We are Axon, a team committed to pushing the boundaries of technology to help you feel more confident in the field, at the station, and in court. From Smart Weapons, like our TASER devices, to police body cameras and digital evidence management systems, every product works together as a single network. Seamlessly integrated. Completely connected. And designed to help police, sheriffs, and law enforcement agencies everywhere make the world a safer place.

### AXON's Mission

The priorities and challenges of law enforcement have been at the core of Axon's mission. We're committed to developing the latest technologies to make the world a safer place. Our mission is simple: Protect Life.

### Our Profile

Our Axon team is based around the globe, with our headquarters and manufacturing in Scottsdale, Arizona. Our software engineering office is in Seattle, WA and our AI Research Team is based out of New York City, NY. Global office locations include Amsterdam, the UK, Vietnam and Finland. Our company is the market leader in conducted electrical weapons, body-worn video and digital evidence management solutions.

### Our Technology Platform

The Axon network includes more than 201,500 software seats booked on the Axon network around the world and is changing the future of public safety.

Axon protects life by connecting devices, apps and people onto one centralized network. Our technologies impact every aspect of an officer's day-to-day experience:

In the field - Our Smart Weapons offer a less-lethal alternative to firearms and have helped saved over 196,000 lives; our body-worn and in-car cameras collect video evidence to capture the truth of an incident; and our mobile applications enable simple evidence collection.

At the station - Our secure, cloud-based digital evidence management solution allows officers and command staff to manage, review, share and process digital evidence using forensic, redaction, transcription and other tools.

For more information, or to identify a point of contact, please visit [www.axon.com](http://www.axon.com)

In the courtroom - Our solutions for prosecutors make collaborating across jurisdictions and agencies easy so that cases can be resolved quickly.





For more information about NicheRMS:

**Cliff Filer**

0451 954 483 (Australia), +44 7525 420407 (UK)

[Clifford.Filer@NicheRMS.com](mailto:Clifford.Filer@NicheRMS.com)

[www.NicheRMS.com](http://www.NicheRMS.com)

Niche Technology is the worldwide leader of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) records management systems for the Five Eyes (FVEY) nations. Our sole focus is the development, implementation, support and enhancement of the Niche Records Management System (NicheRMS), a highly configurable COTS product that meets specific agency needs.

NicheRMS supports the full breadth of operational policing – advanced records management, including Intelligence Management, Investigations Management, Crime and Prosecution Management – in a single, easy-to-use database application. Incident-centric NicheRMS truly breaks down silos between different policing systems.

NicheRMS enables police organizations to re-use the data rather than re-entering it into separate silos as they build their investigations. NicheRMS is fully mobilized with complete RMS functionality available in-car or in the office, on tablets or smart phones, and interacts with specialty devices, such as property bar code readers.

The result is a bona-fide, intelligence-led organization where resources have empirically shown to become more efficient and effective.

NicheRMS is licensed to more than 136,000 sworn officers across the FVEY nations. No other suppliers have delivered projects successfully at scales approaching our customers. All of our projects have been successful, and we have never lost a customer.


**Customers discuss NicheRMS:**

Queensland Police Service (Australia): *"This streamlined information system will break down the distance between police in different corners of the state."*

Ontario Provincial Police (Canada): *"NicheRMS is clearly a much more intuitive product than our legacy RMS."*

South Wales Police (UK): *"To reduce crime 1/5th per annum and increase detections is unheard of – it's exceptional performance in anybody's book. That is a testament to the power of Niche."*

Springfield Police Department (USA): *"I think it has greatly enhanced our operation and made us more effective as an agency by solving crime or, as my crime analysts say, preventing crime."*



# Secured Communications

## UNIVERSAL Platform



Secured Communications has developed a universal communications platform, the Global Secured Network®, through which all mobile device communications and applications can seamlessly integrate and run on a fully secure and encrypted basis via our APIs.

SC provides a data foundation to allow the public infrastructure a way to connect and communicate. This provides global access to the data resources and opens new opportunities for innovation, applications and cooperative research.

SC allows users to write programs, apps, utilities and even interact with devices (IOT). This provides the foundation for a new world of applications to build Smart Cities, leverage the Internet of Life Saving Things (IoLST) and truly change the world in which we live

## PUBLIC SAFETY

### THE STANDARD FOR SECURE interoperable COMMUNICATIONS

- Built by public safety for public safety
- Share more information faster, with the right people
- A complete enterprise solution for secure communication
- Manage and control internal communication
- No impact to IT resources, same day deployment
- Manage bring your own device (BYOD) communication

## COMPANY PROFILE

With former senior FBI, law enforcement and technology leaders, Secured Communications, LLC. is the standard for secure, interoperable public safety and corporate communications.

Secured Communications provides a universal platform through which all mobile device communications and applications can seamlessly integrate and run on a fully secure and encrypted basis.

For more information visit [www.securedcommunications.com](http://www.securedcommunications.com)